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RE´SUME´
Cette the`se comprend trois essais en e´conomie de l’environnement et des ressources
naturelles sous incertitude. Le premier essai propose un mode`le de jeu diffe´rentiel qui
analyse la pollution globale a` travers la queˆte a` l’he´ge´monie politique entre pays. Le
second essai utilise des donne´es boursie`res pour estimer une version stochastique de la
re`gle de Hotelling et ainsi infe´rer sur le roˆle des ressources naturelles non renouvelables
dans la diversification du risque. Le troisie`me essai montre comment la prise en compte
des perspectives futures modifie la re`gle de Hotelling dans un contexte de diversification
du risque.
Mots cle´s: He´ge´monie, Pollution, Ressources non renouvellables, Risque, Capitali-
sation boursie`re, Re´serves prouve´es, Perspectives futures, Utilite´ diffe´rentielle stochas-
tique
ABSTRACT
My thesis is composed of three essays on environmental and natural resource eco-
nomics under uncertainty. The first essay proposes a differential game analysis of the
quest for hegemony among countries as a generator of global pollution. The second es-
say uses stock market data on market capitalization to estimate a stochastic version of
the Hotelling rule of exhaustible resource exploitation and uses it to infer on the riskiness
of investment in nonrenewable resources and its effect on the resource price paths. The
third essay shows how uncertainty about future prospects modifies the Hotelling rule in
a context of risk diversification.
Keywords: Hegemony, Pollution, Exhaustible Natural Resource, Risk, Market Cap-
italization, Proven Reserves, Future Prospects, Stochastic Differential Utility
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INTRODUCTION GE´NE´RALE
Cette the`se est compose´e de trois essais. Le premier essai part de l’hypothe`se que
les pays, en acque´rant plus de puissance e´conomique, augmentent leur probabilite´ d’at-
teindre la position he´ge´monique. La queˆte a` l’he´ge´monie est mode´lise´e comme un jeu
de course ou` les joueurs sont des pays diffe´rencie´s par une dotation en capital qui ge´ne`re
un flux de rendement non polluant. Le niveau d’e´mission d’un pays est suppose´ relie´ a` sa
puissance e´conomique tel que mesure´e par le niveau de production. De l’analyse, deux
types de pays ressortent : les pays richement dote´s, dont le rendement issu de leur dota-
tion est plus grand que le rendement de la re´compense en cas de succe`s dans la course a`
l’he´ge´monie, et les pays pauvrement dote´s, dont le rendement de la re´compense en cas
de succe`s dans cette course est plus grand que celui du flux de rendement issu de leur
dotation. Nous montrons que dans un e´quilibre syme´trique constitue´ de pays pauvre-
ment dote´s, le niveau d’e´quilibre des e´missions est plus grand que celui d’un e´quilibre
syme´trique constitue´ de pays richement dote´s. Dans un monde asyme´trique constitue´ des
deux types de pays, le niveau d’e´mission d’un pays pauvrement dote´ est supe´rieur au ni-
veau d’e´mission d’un pays richement dote´. Les simulations nume´riques indiquent que si
on augmente le nombre de pays richement dote´s tout en maintenant fixe le nombre total
de pays, le niveau d’e´quilibre de la pollution globale baisse ; si les dotations des pays
pauvrement dote´s sont accrues en laissant constante celles des pays richement dote´s, la
pollution globale diminue ; accroıˆtre les dotations des deux types de pays dans les meˆmes
proportions, et donc accroıˆtre la dotation moyenne dans la meˆme proportion, baissera la
pollution globale ; redistribuer des pays richement dote´s vers les pays pauvrement dote´s,
tout en maintenant fixe la dotation moyenne, re´sultera en ge´ne´ral en un accroissement
du niveau d’e´quilibre de la pollution globale.
Le second essai est une e´tude empirique qui utilise les donne´es sur la capitalisation
boursie`re des compagnies minie`res pour estimer une version stochastique de la re`gle de
Hotelling pour le pe´trole, le gaz naturel et le charbon. Un lien formel entre le rende-
ment d’une unite´ de stock de ressource non renouvelable et la diffe´rence entre le taux de
croissance de la capitalisation boursie`re des compagnies minie`res et celui des re´serves
2prouve´es y est formellement e´tabli. La base e´conomique de ce travail est le mode`le
the´orique de Gaudet and Khadr (1991), lequel offre un cadre the´orique ide´al permettant
de connecter la the´orie e´conomique des ressources non renouvelables et l’e´conomie fi-
nancie`re et par ailleurs d’utiliser les outils de l’e´conome´trie financie`re pour cette estima-
tion. Les donne´es concernant les capitalisations boursie`res des entreprises ope´rant dans
le secteur des ressources non renouvelables, et d’autres donne´es comme les rendements
des bonds du tre´sor proviennent de la base de donne´es CRSP qui est l’une des sources
de donne´es historiques les plus comple`tes sur actions e´change´es sur le New York Stock
Exchange, le Nasdaq et l’AMEX. Les donne´es sur les re´serves mondiales de pe´trole et
de charbon proviennent du site web de la compagnie BP. Les donne´es sur la consomma-
tion proviennent du site web de la Federal Reserve St Louis. L’approche e´conome´trique
est base´e sur l’estimation des processus de diffusion en temps continu de´veloppe´ par
Nowman (1997). Les re´sultats montrent qu’investir dans des stocks de ces ressources
naturelles peut constituer une assurance contre le risque du marche´ a` long terme.
Dans le troisie`me essai, je montre comment les perspectives relatives au futur (bonnes
ou mauvaises) sont un facteur important pour la formulation de la re`gle d’Hotelling dans
un contexte de diversification du risque. J’utilise les pre´fe´rences re´cursives en temps
continu de Duffie and Epstein (1992b) dans le mode`le d’e´conomie des ressources na-
turelles de Gaudet et Khadr (1991). Je de´rive une formulation ge´ne´rale de la re`gle de
Hotelling qui comprend trois e´le´ments : un e´le´ment d’assurance comme dans le mode`le
de Gaudet et Khadr (1991), un e´le´ment relatif aux perspectives sur le futur, et un taux
d’actualisation endoge`ne. En comparaison avec la tarification d’un actif reproductible,
il ressort que ce taux d’actualisation endoge`ne joue un roˆle important dans la tarifica-
tion des ressources non renouvelables. Il est montre´ comment cette composante relative
aux perspectives futures influe sur le prix du marche´ de la ressource une fois extraite.
Les implications de ces re´sultats pour les de´cisions d’investissement dans les stocks de
ressources naturelles en terre sont analyse´es.
Ge´rard Gaudet est coauteur du premier essai. J’en ai propose´ l’ide´e et la mode´lisation
et j’en ai fait les analyses. Le Professeur Gaudet a contribue´ a` ame´liorer la structure de
l’article et la pre´sentation finale des re´sultats.
CHAPITRE 1
THE QUEST FOR HEGEMONY AMONG COUNTRIES AND GLOBAL
POLLUTION
1.1 Introduction
Concerns about global pollution in general and global warming in particular have
led to a considerable body of literature. But an important question which has not yet
been formally explored has to do with the relationship between the quest for hegemony
and global pollution. Derived from the original Greek word hegemonia, which means
”leadership”, hegemony can be seen as an institutionalized practice of special rights and
responsibilities conferred on a state with the resources to lead the international system
(Clark (2009)). Most historical ages are marked by the presence of a nation capable of
dominating the course of international politics. Over the last five centuries, Portugal,
the Netherlands, France, Britain, and the United States have played the hegemonic role
Modelski (1987)). 1
The quest for hegemony can be viewed as a status-seeking game among countries
which aspire to the hegemonic status and the important benefits that come with it. 2 A
basic postulate widely accepted among experts of geopolitics is that relative power dif-
ferences between states cause them to compete with one another for relative shifts in
power and status. For centuries, military force was the main source of primacy in the
international system. After the cold war and the advent of nuclear warfare, military force
became a costly and risky means of attaining hegemony and economic force gained pro-
minence as the major factor in determining the primacy or the subordination of states. 3
1. For discussions of the quest for hegemony among countries, see also Kennedy (1987), Black (2007)
and Mosher (2002).
2. Weiss and Fershtman (1980) define status as a ranking of individuals (or groups of individuals)
based on traits, assets and actions. On the subject of status seeking, see also Moldovanu et al. (2007).
3. To quote the political scientist Kenneth Waltz (Waltz 1993, p. 63 and p. 66) : “Without a considerable
economic capability, no state can hope to sustain a world role, as the fate of the Soviet Union has shown.”
and “For a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly. For that reason, the
choice is a difficult one to sustain. Sooner or later, usually sooner, the international status of countries
4It is safe to say that economic strength has become a necessary condition for attaining
hegemony in the international system.
After World War II, the United States, with half the world’s gross national product,
found itself in a uniquely strong position, much surpassing that of Britain at the height
of its power in the nineteenth century, and played the leading role in the internatio-
nal state system. But in the last decades, the United States has been facing new global
players, such as China, India and Brazil, who are making their presence felt in interna-
tional affairs, largely due to the increasing power derived mostly from their expanding
economies. 4 Those emerging economies are transforming the hegemony game into a
multi-player game (Shenkar 2005, p. 162).
But economic and ecological systems are deeply interlocked, in good part because
most of the global pollution released into the atmosphere comes from the combustion of
fossil fuels, which is a driving force of the economic system (see Stern (2007), Chom-
bat (1998), Raupach et al. (2007)). Therefore, because economic activity impacts both
global pollution and the hegemonic game, the world can be viewed as facing a conflict
between the intensity of the hegemony game among countries and the reduction of global
pollution. As has been noted by a former Science Advisor to the U.S. President : “No
realistic response to climate change can ignore the current geopolitical preoccupation
with economic competition among nations” (Marburger 2007, p. 5).
To analyze this issue, this paper builds on the assumption that each country behaves
in such a way as to improve, via its economic strength, the probability that it will attain
the hegemonic position on the world stage. The quest for hegemony is modeled as a
game, with countries being differentiated only by the return on some initial endowment
has risen in step with their material resources. Countries with great-power economies have become great
powers, whether or not reluctantly.” Other political scientists, among them Samuel Huntington (p. 72
Huntington 1993), share this view : “Economic activity [. . . ] is probably the most important source of
power, and in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely, economic power will be
increasingly important in determining the primacy or the subordination of states.” The importance of the
economic battle among hegemonic aspirants is also pointed out by the economist Lester Thurow (Thurow
1993, p. 65) : “Those who control the world’s largest market get to write the rules. That is as it always has
been. When the United States had the world’s largest market, it got to write the rules”
4. See Shenkar (2005), Ikenberry (2008) and Elliott (2007). To quote Oded Shenkar (Shenkar 2005,
p. 38) : “China’s economic aspirations are aligned strongly with its political ambitions, and the regime is
aware more than most of the close connection between the two.”
5which yields a pollution-free flow of income. This return on endowment can be thought
of as being related to the country’s human capital and economic, social and political
institutions. A country’s level of pollution is assumed directly related to its economic
strength, as measured by its level of production. Two types of countries are distingui-
shed : richly-endowed countries, for whom the return on their endowment is greater than
the return they can expect from winning the hegemony race, and poorly-endowed coun-
tries, who can expect a greater return from winning the race than from their endowment.
As we will see, the latter, having more to gain, are more eager players in the hegemony
race and will end up polluting more in equilibrium. The former are more content with
the return they get from their endowment and end up polluting less. We may think of
emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and Russia as being in the category of
poorly-endowed countries, whereas most North American and Western European coun-
tries would fall in the category of richly-endowed countries.
We consider in sequence the equilibria in a world composed of only poorly-endowed
countries, a world composed of only richly-endowed countries and a world in which
both types of countries coexist. We show that in a symmetric world of poorly-endowed
countries the equilibrium level of emissions is larger than in a symmetric world of richly-
endowed countries : the former, being less well endowed to begin with, try harder to
win the race. In the asymmetric world composed of both types of countries, there can
be multiple equilibria. In all of those equilibria, the poorly-endowed countries will be
polluting more than the richly-endowed countries. Numerical simulations show that if
the number of richly-endowed countries is increased keeping the total number of coun-
tries constant, the equilibrium level of global emissions will decrease ; if the lot of the
poorly-endowed countries is increased by increasing their initial endowment keeping
that of the richly-endowed countries constant, global pollution will decrease ; increasing
the endowments of each type of countries in the same proportion, and hence increasing
the average endowment in that proportion, will decrease global pollution ; redistributing
from the richly-endowed in favor of the poorly-endowed while keeping the average en-
dowment constant will in general result in an increase in the equilibrium level of global
pollution.
6In the next section, we describe the main features of the model. Section 1.3 presents
the hegemony game, which borrows some of its features from the patent-race literature
(Reingamun (1982), Lee and Wilde (1980) and Loury (1979)). Section 1.4 analyzes
the equilibria under the different scenarios described above and discusses the effect of
various ways of modifying the distribution of endowments in the case where poorly-
endowed and richly-endowed countries coexist. We conclude with some final remarks in
Section 1.5.
1.2 The Model
Consider N countries competing to reach the hegemonic position. The probability
for any country of reaching the hegemonic position increases with its output, Qi(t), a
measure of its economic strength. Country i’s production gives rise to the emission of
pollution at the rate ei(t). For simplicity it will be assumed that one unit of production
gives rise to one unit of emission : ei(t) = Qi(t). This pollution is global, in the sense
that it will affect each country equally.
To visualize the conditions required to win the hegemony race, we can use Greek
foot races or sporting contests as analogies. The first condition to win the game is to
get to the finish line. The second condition is to be the first among all players to cross
the finish line. The prize for crossing the finish line first is greater than the prize of the
losers.
In the present context, the winner gets the hegemon position and gets to enjoy “struc-
tural power”, which Nye (1990) called the ”soft power”. This structural power allows the
hegemon to occupy a central and prestigious position within the international system and
to play a leading role in setting standards (political, cultural, economic) in organizing the
world. We borrow from the paper of Moldovanu et al. (2007) the notion of “pure status”
prize, which is related to the notion that a contestant is happier when he has other contes-
tants below him. Hence the hegemon enjoys a “pure status” prize A. Any country other
than the hegemon gets a “prize” of B < A. For simplicity, A and B will be assumed
constant.
7The time it will take for country i to cross the finish line (i.e., to attain the necessary
characteristics that a country must satisfy to get the hegemonic role) is a random variable,
τi. Uncertainty about the finishing time is determined by the hazard rate Hi(t), which, by
definition, is given by : 5
Hi(t) =
Pi(t < τi ≤ t+dt)
Pi(τi > t)
.
It represents the propensity to reach the finish line at time t, given that it has not hap-
pened before t. The hazard rate is assumed positively related to the country’s level of
production, Qi(t), and hence to its rate of pollution emissions, ei(t). It will be assumed
that Hi(t) = Qi(t) = ei(t). It follows that the probability of reaching the finish line by
time t is the cumulative distribution function Fi(t), which can be expressed, using the
hazard rate, as :
Fi(t) = 1− e−
∫ t
o ei(u)du. (1.1)
This means that the probability of reaching the finish line by time t increases with coun-
try i’s cumulative emissions on the interval [0, t], given by the term
∫ t
o ei(u)du.
The first country to cross the finish line becomes the winner of this hegemony game
and obtains the prize denoted above by A. The time at which one of the countries be-
comes the hegemon is a random variable and is given by
τ = minτi
i=1,...,N
.
This is the stopping time of the game. It depends stochastically on the vector (e1(t), ...,eN(t))
of emission levels by each country. Given the vector (e1(t), ...,eN(t)) of emission levels,
the instantaneous probability that country i will win the hegemony game on the infinite-
simal interval [t, t+dt] will be given by :
F˙i(t)
N
∏
j 6=i
[
1−Fj(t)
]
dt,
5. Cioffi-Revilla (1998) interprets the hazard rate as a force which, although it does not determine the
realization of a political event, acts on it by influencing its temporal evolution. In this paper, the hazard
rate consists of economic strength, a causal force arising from the country’s decisions which influences
the hegemony race.
8where F˙i(t) denotes the time derivative of Fi(t).
The instantaneous probability that country i will lose the hegemony race on the infini-
tesimal interval [t, t+dt] is the probability that one of the N−1 other countries becomes
the winner over that interval of time. This is given by :
j=N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
F˙j(t)
(
k=N
∏
k=1,k 6= j
[1−Fk(t)]
)
dt.
The instantaneous probability that no country wins the hegemony game on the infinite-
simal interval of time [t, t+dt] is :
j=N
∏
j=1
[1−Fj(t)]dt.
If we denote by S(t) the stock of pollution at time t, then
S˙(t) = e1(t)+ ....+ eN(t)− kS(t), S(0) = S0 > 0 given, (1.2)
where 0 < k < 1 is the coefficient of natural purification. Each country is assumed to
suffer equally from the global stock of pollution. The damage function is assumed to be
a nonlinear increasing and convex function of the stock, more specifically a quadratic :
Di(S(t)) =
b
2
S(t)2 (1.3)
with b a strictly positive constant.
It will also be assumed that the countries are differentiated solely by the return, pii,
which they get on some initial endowment. This exogenous parameter will capture the
idea of disparity between countries and the country’s pollution emissions will be assu-
med independent of this permanent flow of benefits. Among the factors that can affect
this return on endowment one can think of human capital and the quality of economic,
social and political institutions.
91.3 The hegemony game
The hegemony game bears a lot of similarity to an R&D race, as analyzed in Rein-
gamun (1982), Lee and Wilde (1980) and Loury (1979). The value function of country
i, i = 1, . . . ,N, in quest of hegemony, is given by :
Vi(F1(t), ...,FN(t),S(t)) = max
ei(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
AF˙i(t)∏
j 6=i
[1−Fj(t)]
+ B∑
j 6=i
F˙j(t)∏
k 6= j
[1−Fk(t)]+(pii−Di(S(t)))
N
∏
j=1
[1−Fj(t)]
}
dt
where the maximization is subject (1.2) and to ei(t)≥ 0. The stochastic variable τ having
been eliminated by formulating the objective functional in terms of expectations, this be-
comes a deterministic N-player differential game, with control variables e1(t), ...,eN(t)
and state variables (F1(t), ...,FN(t),S(t)). The objective functional of country i consists
of three terms. The first reflects net benefits if the country succeeds in the quest for the
hegemon’s position. The second term is the net benefits if the country loses the quest
for the hegemon position. The third term represents the pollution damage and the payoff
generated by the country’s endowment. All three components are weighted by their res-
pective probabilities.
In order to put the emphasis on the characterization of the hegemony game, it will
henceforth be assumed that the pollution stock is stationary and hence given by S(t) =
∑Ni=1 ei(t)/k. We can therefore rewrite the damage function as D(S(t))= β
[
∑Ni=1 ei(t)
]2
/2,
where β = b/k2.
Following Dockner et al. (2000), let us now introduce the following state transfor-
mation which will help in simplifying the formulation :
− log(1−Fi(t)) =
∫ t
o
ei(u)du≡ Zi(t), (1.4)
which, upon differentiation with respect to time, gives :
Z˙i(t) = ei(t). (1.5)
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The value function of country i can then be rewritten :
Vi(Z1(t), ...,ZN(t))=max
ei(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−∑
N
j=1 Zi(t)
Aei(t)+B∑
j 6=i
e j(t)− β2
[
N
∑
i=1
ei(t)
]2
+pii
dt.
where the maximization is with respect to (1.5).
Notice that although each country knows the full state vector (Z1(t), ...,ZN(t)), only
a function of it, namely the one-dimensional state variable X(t) = e−∑
N
j=1 Zi(t), is payoff
relevant. 6 The problem of country i can therefore be transformed into the following
one-state variable problem :
Vi(X(t)) = max
ei(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtX(t)
Aei(t)+B∑
j 6=i
e j(t)− β2
[
N
∑
i=1
ei(t)
]2
+pii
dt (1.6)
where the maximization is subject to
X˙(t) =−X(t)
(
N
∑
j=1
ei(t)
)
. (1.7)
The state variable X(t) gives the probability that the game has not yet ended at date t.
The corresponding current value Hamiltonian is given by
Hi(t) = X(t)
Aei(t)+B∑
j 6=i
e j(t)− β2
[
N
∑
i=1
ei(t)
]2
+pii
−λi(t)[X(t)( N∑
j=1
ei(t)
)]
,
where λi(t) is the shadow value associated to the state variable X(t).
Letting θi(t) = ∑ j 6=i e j(t), that is the sum of the emission rates of country i’s rivals,
and taking into account that X(t)> 0, the following conditions, along with (1.7), become
necessary, for i = 1, . . . ,N :
A−β [ei(t)+θi(t)]−λi(t)≤ 0, [A−β [ei(t)+θi(t)]−λi(t)]ei(t) = 0, ei(t)≥ 0 (1.8)
6. See Dockner et al. (2000), p. 276.
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λ˙i(t)−rλi(t) = (ei(t)+θi(t))λi(t)−
(
Aei(t)+Bθi(t)− β2 [ei(t)+θi(t)]
2+pii
)
. (1.9)
Differentiating (1.8) with respect to t and substituting into (1.9) we get :
β E˙(t) =
β
2
E(t)2+ rβE(t)− (A−B)θi(t)− (rA−pii) (1.10)
where E(t) = ei(t)+θi(t). But since by assumption the stock of pollution is in a steady
state, so is E(t) and therefore E˙(t) = 0. The result is a second degree polynomial in E(t)
with roots :
E(t) =−r±
√
r2+
2
β
[(A−B)θi(t)+(rA−pii)]. (1.11)
Notice that we can without loss of generality set β = 1 and reinterpret A, B and pii as
A/β , B/β and pii/β . The discriminant is then given by :
δ (θi) = r2+2[(A−B)θi+(rA−pii)].
It will be assumed strictly positive to assure distinct real roots. 7 Then, neglecting the
negative root and taking into account the nonnegativity constraint on ei(t), the best res-
ponse function of country i can, at any given t, be written :
ei(θi) = max
{
0,−r−θi+
√
r2+2[(A−B)θi+(rA−pii)]
}
. (1.12)
This reaction function is not monotone. In fact, in the positive range, the second deri-
vative is strictly negative (since δ (θi)> 0) and hence the best response function is strictly
concave in that range and reaches a maximum for θ =
[
(A−B)2− (r2+2(Ar−pii))
]
/2(A−
B).
Setting −r−θi+
√
r2+2[(A−B)θi+(rA−pii) = 0 yields the second degree poly-
nomial θ 2i +2[(r− [A−B])θi−2(Ar−pii) = 0 whose roots are given by
θi =−(r− (A−B))±
√
(r− (A−B))2+2(rA−pii). (1.13)
7. If δ (·) is negative, then, because of the nonnegativity constraint on ei, there still exists a solution in
real space given by ei(t) = 0 and hence E(t) = 0.
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The product of those roots is −2(rA−pii). It follows that the roots will be of opposite
sign if rA < pii and of the same sign if rA > pii. In the latter case, since the sum of the
roots is−2(r− [A−B]), the two roots are negative if A−B< r, in which case the country
would choose ei(θi) = 0 for all θi > 0, not participating in the race for hegemony being
a dominant strategy. Both roots will be positive if A−B > r. We will assume A−B > r
so that the quest for hegemony is sufficiently attractive for the country in this situation
to participate actively in the game at least for some positive values of θi. 8 In the case
where rA < pii, we retain only the positive root, for obvious reasons.
We will, from this point on, distinguish two types of countries according to their
endowments : pi1 and pi2 > pi1, with rA > pi1 and rA < pi2. Countries of type 1 will be
called poorly-endowed countries, in the sense that the interest flow on the hegemon’s
prize exceeds the return from its endowment ; conversely, countries of type 2 are richly-
endowed countries, the return on their endowment being greater than the interest flow
on the payoff from winning the quest for hegemony.
By a slight abuse of notation, we will denote by e1(t) the emissions of the typical
poorly-endowed country (type 1) and by θ1(t) the sum of the emission of that country’s
rivals. Similarly for e2(t) and θ2(t) in the case of the richly-endowed countries (type 2).
We may then write the best response to θ1 of the typical country of type 1 at any time
t as :
e1(θ1) =
 −r−θ1+
√
2(A−B)θ1+ r2+2(Ar−pi1) if θ1 ∈ [0, θ˜1)
0 if θ1 ∈ [θ˜1,+∞]
(1.14)
where θ˜1 is the positive root of (1.13). This is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
8. Recall that we have earlier set β = 1, so that A−B is to be interpreted as (A−B)/β , where β = b/k2.
Hence, written β < (A−B)/r, the condition can be interpreted as : the additional value of winning the
hegemony game rather than losing it, discounted to infinity, exceeds β . The parameter β can be interpreted
as the damage cost parameter with respect to the flow of emission in steady-state, whereas b is the damage
coat parameter with respect to the stock of pollution.
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Figure 1.1 – The best response function of a poorly-endowed country
For this type of country, winning the hegemony game is sufficiently rewarding com-
pared to the return it gets from its exogenous endowment that it pays to participate ac-
tively in the hegemony game even for low levels of effort by all the other countries, as
measured by their emissions ; hence e1(θ1 = 0) > 0. As the level of emissions of its
rivals increases, its best response is at first to increase its own level of effort and, as a
result, its emissions. Beyond some point θ˜1, it becomes optimal to reduce its emissions
as the level of emissions of others increases, until it reaches zero and remains there for
all greater θ1s.
Figure 1.2 – The best response function of a richly-endowed country
In the case of the richly-endowed countries, the best response is similar except for the
14
fact that the high return it gets from its endowment relative to the return from winning the
game renders it not optimal to participate actively up to some minimal level of emissions
by the other countries. Its best response as a function of θ2 is therefore : 9
e2(θ2) =

0 if θ2 ∈ [0, θ˜2]
−r−θ2+
√
2(A−B)θ2+ r2+2(Ar−pi2) if θ2 ∈ (θ˜2, ˜˜θ 2)
0 if θ2 ∈ [˜˜θ 2,+∞]
(1.15)
where θ˜2 <
˜˜θ 2 are the two (positive) roots of (1.13). This is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
As can be seen from (1.13), (1.14) and (1.15), for both types of countries, the greater
the gap (A−B) between the winner’s prize and the losers’ prize, the greater the reaction
to any given θi, and hence the greater the country’s level of emissions. Similarly for the
gap (rA−pii) between the interest flow from the hegemon’s prize and the return to the
country’s endowment. But the poorly-endowed countries, whose return on endowment
is smaller than the return to be expected from the hegemon’s prize, are more eager in the
quest for hegemony than are the richly-endowed countries. Each of them therefore reacts
in a stronger fashion to any given θi than does a richly-endowed country, so that e1(x)>
e2(x) for any x< θ˜1. The richly-endowed countries, whose return on endowment exceeds
the return they can expect on the hegemon’s prize, are more content and as a consequence
react less strongly to any given level of total effort in the quest for hegemony by their
rivals.
1.4 The equilibrium outcomes
In this section we characterize the equilibrium solution to the hegemony game and
analyze the consequences for global pollution for, in order, a world of identical poorly-
endowed countries, a world of identical richly-endowed countries and a world composed
9. In the limiting case where the discriminant of (1.13) is zero, θ˜2 =
˜˜θ2 = −(r− [A−B]), which is
positive by assumption. Substituting this value for θ2 in (1.15), it is easily verified that e2(θ2) = 0 for all
θ2 > 0 : it is optimal for the typical richly-endowed countries not to participate actively in the hegemony
game no matter what the total level of emissions of its rivals. We will assume this uninteresting case away
by assuming the discriminant of (1.13) to be strictly positive.
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of both poorly-endowed and richly-endowed countries.
1.4.1 Equilibrium in a world of poorly-endowed countries
Consider a world where there are N identical countries of type 1 (rA > pi1) in quest
of hegemony. Then there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, given by
e∗1(N) =
−[(N−1)(A−B)−Nr]+
√
[(N−1)(A−B)−Nr]2+2N2(Ar−pi1)
N2
(1.16)
This is obtained by setting θ1 = (N−1)e1 in (1.14), because of symmetry, and keeping
only the positive root of the resulting polynomial in e1.
Figure 1.3 illustrates this equilibrium for N = 2, given by the intersection of the
reaction function with the 45-degree line, and for N > 2, given by its intersection with the
lower line θ1/(N−1). Since the equilibrium for N = 2 will always be in the decreasing
part of the best response function, so will the equilibrium for all N > 2. It follows that as
N increases, e∗1(N) necessarily decreases. Indeed, from (1.16), it is verified that :
de∗1(N)
dN
< 0 and lim
N→∞
e∗1(N) = 0.
Hence, if we let N tend to infinity, the contribution of each individual country to glo-
bal emissions becomes negligible. However the total emissions, Ne∗1(N), are monotone
increasing and, as N tends to infinity, tend to the following positive value :
limN→∞Ne∗1(N) =−(A−B)+ r+
√
(A−B)2+ r2+2(Ar−pi1)> 0.
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Figure 1.3 – The equilibrium with N poorly-endowed countries
1.4.2 Equilibrium in a world of richly-endowed countries
Consider now a world where all N countries are richly-endowed, hence of type 2
(rA< pi2). The quest for hegemony in this case can lead to multiple symmetric equilibria.
Setting θ2 = (N − 1)e2 (by symmetry), there clearly always exists an equilibrium
where each country is content with the return from its endowment and hence does not
participate actively in the quest for hegemony : e0∗2 (N) = 0. If the gap between the return
from the countries’ endowment and the return on the hegemony prize is sufficiently high
and the number of countries sufficiently low, this will in fact be the only equilibrium, as
illustrated in Figure 1.4 .
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Figure 1.4 – Unique zero-emission equilibrium with N richly-endowed countries
As the gap between the return on endowment and the return on the prize falls (gi-
ven the number of countries), or as the number of countries increases (given the gap in
returns), two positive equilibria will appear in addition to the e∗2(N) = 0 equilibrium.
These are given by :
ea∗2 (N) =
N [r− (A−B)]+(A−B)−
√
[(N−1)(A−B)−Nr]2+2N2(Ar−pi2)
N2
(1.17)
and
eb∗2 (N) =
N [r− (A−B)]+(A−B)+
√
[(N−1)(A−B)−Nr]2+2N2(Ar−pi2)
N2
,
(1.18)
obtained from (1.15) with θ2 = (N−1)e2. There are then three equilibria, characterized
by (e0∗2 (N), e
a∗
2 (N), e
b∗
2 (N)), with e
0∗
2 (N) and e
b∗
2 (N) being stable and e
a∗
2 (N) unstable,
in the sense that any small deviation will lead the system to one of the other two equi-
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libria. 10 The unstable equilibrium ea∗2 (N) occurs in the increasing part of the best res-
ponse function, while the stable equilibrium eb∗2 (N) occurs in its decreasing part. This
three equilibria situation is illustrated in Figure 1.5.
Figure 1.5 – Three equilibria with N richly-endowed countries
Like in the world of poorly-endowed countries of the previous subsection,
lim
N→∞
ea∗2 (N) = e
b∗
2 (N) = e
0∗
2 (N) = 0,
which simply means that the individual emissions become negligible as the number of
countries tends to zero, as can be expected. However, in the unstable equilibrium, we
now have
limN→∞Nea∗2 (N) = 0,
10. A two equilibria case can also occur if the discriminant in (1.17) and (1.18) happens to be zero, so
that ea∗2 (N) and e
b∗
2 (N) coincide. This can be illustrated by the tangency of the line e2 = (1/(N−1))θ2 and
the best response function. Of the two equilibria, only e0∗2 (N) is then stable. We will ignore this possibility
in what follows.
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so that as the number of countries tends to infinity, both the individual emissions and
the total emissions tend to zero. The stable equilibrium eb∗2 (N) has the expected property
that
limN→∞Neb∗2 (N) =−(A−B)+ r+
√
(A−B)2+ r2+2(Ar−pi2)> 0.
This expression is the same as in the case of the poorly-endowed countries, except for
pi1 being replaced by pi2. Since pi2 > pi1, this positive quantity is therefore smaller than
for the poorly-endowed countries.
As can easily be seen by comparing (1.16) to (1.17) and (1.18), the fact that pi2 > pi1
implies that the equilibrium individual emissions will be smaller in a richly-endowed
symmetric world than in a poorly-endowed one. This again reflects the fact that more
eager poorly-endowed countries will be making greater efforts in the quest for hegemony
than more content richly-endowed countries.
1.4.3 Equilibria in a world of both poorly-endowed and richly-endowed countries
A more realistic and more interesting situation is one where both poorly-endowed
and richly-endowed countries coexist. Assume now a world composed of N1 poorly-
endowed countries and N2 richly-endowed countries, with N1+N2 = N. The configura-
tion of the equilibria will then depend on the distribution of countries between the two
types.
From (1.14) and (1.15) we find that three types of equilibria can exist, and they may
coexist. These are
e∗1(N1,N2) =
2(N1(1−r−N1)+
√
[2(N1(1−r−N1)]2+8N1(Ar−pi1)
2N21
e∗2(N1,N2) = 0
 (1.19)
e∗1(N1,N2) =
−
[
2(N1+N2)(r+
N2(pi1−pi2)
A−B )−2(N1+N2−1)(A−B)
]
−
√
∆(N1,N2,pi1,pi2,A,B,r)
2(N1+N2)2
e∗2(N1,N2) = e
∗
1(N1,N2)+
pi1−pi2
A−B
 (1.20)
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and
e∗1(N1,N2) =
−
[
2(N1+N2)(r+
N2(pi1−pi2)
A−B )−2(N1+N2−1)(A−B)
]
+
√
∆(N1,N2,pi1,pi2,A,B,r)
2(N1+N2)2
e∗2(N1,N2) = e
∗
1(N1,N2)+
pi1−pi2
A−B
 (1.21)
where the ∆(N1,N2,pi1,pi2,A,B,r) is given by :
∆(N1,N2,pi1,pi2,A,B,r)=
{
2(N1+N2)(r+
N2(pi1−pi2)
A−B )−2(N1+N2−1)(A−B))
}2
−4(N1+N2)2(
[(
r+
N2(pi1−pi2)
A−B
)2
−2N2(pi1−pi2)− r2−2(Ar−pi1)
]
.
In the equilibrium described by (1.19), only the poorly-endowed countries participate
actively in the quest for hegemony, the richly-endowed countries being content enough
with the return from their endowment relative to the return on winning the hegemony
race so as not to participate actively. In the other two equilibria, both types of countries
participate actively in the race, but the individual emissions of the poorly-endowed coun-
tries are always higher than those of the richly-endowed countries. Again, this reflects
the greater eagerness of the poorly-endowed countries.
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Figure 1.6 – Equilibria in a world composed of poorly-endowed and richly-endowed
countries
The expression for ∆(N1,N2,pi1,pi2,A,B,r) is the discriminant of the second degree
polynomial obtained by substituting the best response function of the richly-endowed
countries into that of the poorly-endowed countries in order to solve for the equilibrium
emissions of the latter. If it is strictly positive, thus eliminating complex roots, the three
equilibria can coexist. This is depicted in Figure 1.6 for N1 = N2 = 1. The equilibrium
given by (1.20) occurs in the increasing part of the two reaction functions, with the reac-
tion function of the poorly-endowed country cutting that of the richly-endowed country
from above, and is unstable. The other two equilibria are stable. As ∆(·) is increased
there comes a point where e1(0) > θ˜2. If ∆(·) is such that θ˜2 < e1(0) < ˜˜θ 2, there is
then a unique stable equilibrium with e1 > 0 and e2 > 0, characterized by (1.21). If
e1(0)≥ ˜˜θ 2, then the only equilibrium has e1 > 0 and e2 = 0, characterized by (1.19).
If ∆(·) were negative, then, in the absence of the nonnegativity constraint on the
emission rates, e1(e2) would lie everywhere above and to the left of e2(e1), there would
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be no intersection between the two best response curves and hence there would be no
solution in real space. However, because of the nonnegativity constraint on e2 the two
best response functions intersect along the horizontal axis and there still exists in that
case a unique stable equilibrium in real space, characterized by (1.19), with 0 < e1 < θ˜2
and e2 = 0. 11
The equilibrium level of global emissions is given by N1e∗1(N1,N2)+N2e
∗
2(N1,N2).
Recall that the date at which the new hegemon is determined and the race to hegemony
ends is τ = min{τ1, . . . ,τN}. Substituting for e∗1(N1,N2) and e∗2(N1,N2) into (1.1), we
find that in equilibrium the probability of reaching the finish line by time t, P(τ < t), is :
F(t) = 1− e−(N1e∗1(N1,N2)+N2e2(N1,N2))t .
It follows that the expected date at which the new hegemon is determined is given by :
E(τ) = 1/(N1e∗1(N1,N2)+N2e2(N1,N2)).
Hence any change in the configuration of parameters (such as N1, N2, pi1 or pi2) which
results in a greater equilibrium level of global pollution, will move the expected ending
date of the hegemony race closer. This can be interpreted as saying that the more intense
the race, the closer the expected date at which the race is won.
A number of sensitivity analyses are of particular interest. The first one consists in
simply changing the distribution of countries between the two types, keeping the total
number of countries constant. Numerical simulations indicate that increasing the num-
ber of richly-endowed countries while keeping N and all the other parameters except N1
constant results in a monotonic decrease in global pollution in both of the stable equili-
bria. 12 This makes sense, since, as we get closer to N2 =N, we get closer to the world of
11. If ∆(·) = 0 we have multiple real roots. The equilibria in (1.20) and in (1.21) then coincide at the
tangency point of the two curves and the three equilibria reduce to two. The equilibrium given by (1.19)
is then the only stable equilibrium.
12. All the numerical simulations are done for the interior stable equilibrium characterized by (1.21), in
which both types of countries are polluting to begin with. This seems like the most realistic initial situation
to consider.
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richly-endowed countries described in Subsection 1.4.2. Similarly, if N1 tends to N un-
der the same conditions, the world converges towards one of poorly-endowed countries
only, as described in Subsection 1.4.1, and global emissions increase as N1 increases.
A second type of sensitivity analysis consist in reducing inequalities by improving
the lot of the poorly-endowed countries without changing that of the richly-endowed
countries. This might be thought of as measures exogenous to the model that result in
improvements in the economic, political and social institutions of the poorly-endowed
countries, for instance, or in their human capital. As can be seen from (1.19), (1.20)
and (1.21) by letting pi1 tend to pi2 with pi2 fixed, this reduces the equilibrium level of
global pollution. Indeed, as pi1 approaches pi2, e∗1(N1,N2) falls and approaches e
∗
2(N1,N2)
and we move towards the equilibrium of a world composed only of richly-endowed
countries. At the limit, if pi1 = pi2 > rA, then e∗1(N1,N2) = e
∗
2(N1,N2)) and the level
of global pollution will be lower than when the two types of countries coexist with
pi1 < rA < pi2, since then e∗1(N1,N2)> e
∗
2(N1,N2)).
Alternatively, we can consider redistributing from the richly-endowed countries to-
wards the poorly-endowed countries by increasing pi1 while keeping constant the mean
endowment n1pi1+n2pi2 (where ni =Ni/N) and keeping pi1 < rA< pi2, so that both types
of countries continue to coexist. This forcibly means reducing pi2 accordingly. Numeri-
cal simulations show that this will result in an increase in the level of emissions of the
richly-endowed countries, who become relatively more eager in the hegemony race, and
a decrease in the level of emissions of the poorly-endowed countries, who become relati-
vely less eager. But the richly-endowed countries’ reaction to the fall in their endowment
is stronger than that of the poorly-endowed countries to the increase in their endowment,
with the overall result being a monotonic increase in global pollution. 13
13. The starting point of the simulations is the interior stable equilibrium obtained for parameter values
A = 10, B = 3, r = 0.027, pi1 = 0.1, pi2 = 1, N = 100. The simulations were done for various values of
N1 and N2, and hence of n1pi1 + n2pi2. As long as pi1 is less than rA = 0.27, global pollution increases
monotonically with pi1. When pi1 exceeds 0.27, all countries become richly-endowed, although unequally
so as long as pi1 6= pi2, and we would have an asymmetric equilibrium in a world of richly-endowed
countries. Continuing to redistribute in this way from pi2 towards pi1 beyond this point will continue to
increase pollution over some positive interval. But, if we push this redistribution far enough, at some
point, if all countries feel sufficiently rich, they will drop out of the race and the world moves to a zero-
emissions equilibrium. When this may happen will of course depend, among other things, on the values
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Finally, if it were possible to increase pi1, pi2 and the mean endowment in the same
proportion, global pollution would decrease monotonically as a function of that propor-
tion : making the whole world better endowed, so that the hegemon’s prize does not look
as attractive, would result in a reduction in global emissions. The same can be said of a
decrease in the hegemon’s prize, A.
1.5 Concluding remarks
We have sought to analyze the consequences for global pollution of the quest for
hegemony in a world in which economic strength, as measured by the level of econo-
mic output, drives this quest by increasing the probability of a country becoming the
new hegemon. In doing so, we have differentiated between poorly-endowed and richly-
endowed countries. The payoff from winning the hegemony race is more attractive to
the poorly-endowed countries than to the richly-endowed countries. As a result they are
more aggressive players in the quest for hegemony and end up being bigger polluters
in equilibrium. The analysis however suggests ways in which global pollution might be
reduced by acting to improve the lot the poorly-endowed countries without impacting
directly on the richly-endowed. These would seem to rest on measures designed to im-
prove the major factors that determine the return from their endowment, such as their
human capital and their economic, social and political institutions.
In order to emphasize the role of the relative return from initial endowments, we have
assumed that it is the only distinguishing factor between countries. In further analysis,
one might want to explicitly take into account other distinguishing factors, such as the
size of the countries, as measured by their population for instance. There is however no
reason to believe that this would change the qualitative results of our analysis.
of (N1,N2) and of pi2.
CHAPITRE 2
ESTIMATION OF THE HOTELLING RULE FOR OIL AND FOR COAL
UNDER STOCHASTIC INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
2.1 Introduction
What role do in situ nonrenewable resource stocks play in a context of risk diversi-
fication in the long run ? This paper provides an empirical insight on this issue by using
market capitalization of companies holding oil or coal in the ground to empirically in-
vestigate the optimal rule of extracting exhaustible resource stock derived in the resource
economic model of Gaudet and Khadr (1991). Gaudet and Khadr’s stochastic Hotelling
rule provides a useful theoretical framework to understand the evolution of the return on
holding a nonrenewable resource stock in a context of risk diversification. But from an
empirical point of view, very few papers have looked at the holding of natural resource
stocks from the perspective of risk diversification (Gaudet (2007)).
Slade and Thille (1997) is one of them. They modified the framework of Gaudet and
Khadr (1991) and specified an econometric static approach that has the inconvenience of
not taking into account the effects of time-varying investment opportunities in resource
exploitation. They found a negative beta (β ), the parameter measuring the riskiness of
holding in situ resource stocks of copper, which suggests that copper stocks can be used
to hedge against market risk. They proxy the in situ value of copper as the difference
between price and the marginal extraction costs estimated by Young (1992).
In another study, Young and Ryan (1996) take a different approach for lead, zinc,
copper and silver by using a time varying coefficients econometric specification. They
proxy the value of a unit of the resource stock by the difference between the Canadian
price of the metal and the average operating costs available for the aggregate mining
divisions such as copper-gold-silver, nickel-copper-zinc, and silver-lead-zinc.
Also worth mentioning is Livernois et al. (2006) who investigate the riskiness of
holding timberland by using the stumpage price bids as a direct measure of scarcity rent.
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Finally, Roberts (2001) estimated Euler equations for eight natural resources assets
(aluminum, coal, copper, crude oil, lead, natural gas, silver, and zinc) and found that
hedging demand can explain why natural assets are held by investors. He proxies the in
situ value of one unit of the resource stocks by using the gross price.
The proxy used for the scarcity rent in this paper is the difference between the growth
rate of market capitalization of mining firms and that of proved reserves. 1 To justify this
choice, we derive a formal relationship between the return on a unit of the resource in
the ground and the stock market return of a mining company. We then use the market
capitalization of mining companies and proved reserves in the empirical investigation of
Gaudet and Khadr’s stochastic Hotelling rule. The econometric approach used is closely
related to that of Nowman (1997) for the estimation of stochastic diffusion processes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Gaudet and Khadr’s stochastic
Hotelling rule. Section 3 describes the econometric approach. Section 4 relates a firm’s
market capitalization to the return on its in situ stock of the natural resource. Section 4
presents the data, while Section 6 presents the results of the econometric estimation of
the model for both oil and coal. The final section offers concluding comments.
2.2 Gaudet and Khadr’s stochastic Hotelling rule
In this section we synthesize the main features and results of the Gaudet and Khadr
(1991) model, which is the foundation for our empirical work. They assume a two good
economy, one of which is a nonrenewable natural resource, whose stock at date t, S(t),
is irreversibly reduced by extraction. The other is a reproducible composite good, that
can be either consumed or accumulated. If accumulated, it can be either in the form of
physical capital, whose accumulated stock is denoted K(t), or of a “bond”. The accumu-
lated stock of bonds is assumed to reproduce itself at an exogenously given risk free rate
r(t), which represents the force of interest.
Both the production of the composite good and the extraction of the natural resource
are assumed to be stochastic. More precisely, if y(t) denotes the flow of production of the
1. Miller and Upton (1985a) is the pioneering paper that relies on the market values of oil reserves to
investigate the Hotelling rule. See also Miller and Upton (1985b)
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composite good, x(t) denotes the flow of extraction of the resource and θ1(t) and θ2(t)
are two stochastic productivity indices, then the stochastic production and extraction
processes are represented respectively by
y(t) = F(Ky(t),x(t),θ1(t)) (2.1)
and
x(t) = G(Kx(t),θ2(t)), (2.2)
where Ky(t)+Kx(t) = K(t). The productivity indices θ1 and θ2 are assumed to evolve
over time according to Itoˆ processes of the form :
dθi = µidt+σiξi
√
dt, i = 1,2, (2.3)
with ξi ∼ N(0,1), cov(dθ1,dθ2) = σ12dt + o(dt) and σ12 = σ1σ2cov(ξ1,ξ2). The drift
µi and the variance σi can depend on time and on the state.
The representative consumer derives utility U(c(t)) from consuming the flow c(t)
of the composite good and is the ultimate owner of the stock of composite good and
the stock of the natural resource. He chooses at each date his consumption and the al-
location of his wealth between the resource stock and the accumulated composite good
so as to maximize his discounted flow of future utility subject to his stochastic wealth
constraint. His consumption and portfolio decisions generate consumption and asset de-
mands, through which he sends price signals to the resource firms and the firms produ-
cing the composite good. The firms take those demand prices as given in making their
extraction and production decisions, which in turn generate the asset returns that the
consumer takes as given when establishing his opportunity set, as determined by his
wealth constraint. The prices and asset returns are taken to be those that simultaneously
equilibrate the markets and are shown to also follow Itoˆ processes, whose drifts and
variances are derived from the market equilibrium conditions.
Denote by λ (t) the price of a unit of resource in situ and let µS(t) = 1λ (t)
1
dt Et(dλ (t)).
This is the expected instantaneous rate of return on the resource stock being held in the
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ground. Gaudet and Khadr show that, in equilibrium,
µS(t) = r(t)+A(c(t))σSc, (2.4)
where A(c) = −U ′′c/U ′ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion and σSc =
cov(dλ/λ , dc/c).
This is a consumption-beta formulation of the Hotelling rule. Notice that if U ′′ = 0,
then this intertemporal arbitrage condition simply says that the expected rate of change
in the value of a unit of in situ resource must equal the rate of interest. If U ′′ < 0, which
we will assume, then A(c(t)) is positive and the consumer is risk averse. Then, whether
the expected rate of change in the price of the in situ resource (i.e. the expected rate of
return on the resource) is greater or smaller than the rate of interest depends on whether
the observed rate of change in the price of reserves, dλ/λ , is positively or negatively
correlated to the rate of change of consumption, dc/c. If positively correlated, then the
resource is considered a risky asset and its expected return will exceed the rate of interest
in equilibrium. If negatively correlated, the resource is considered non risky and the
excess return will be negative, since holding the resource then constitutes an insurance
against adverse changes in consumption.
If we further denote by µM(t) the expected rate of return on any market portfolio
whose observed return has a nonzero covariance with changes in consumption, then, in
equilibrium, we will also have
µM(t) = r(t)+A(c(t))σMc. (2.5)
From (2.4) and (2.5) it follows that
µS(t)− r(t) = β (t)[µM(t)− r(t)], (2.6)
where β = σSc/σMc is the so-called “beta coefficient” associated to the resource stock
as an asset. Thus, depending on whether β (t) is positive or negative, the expected excess
return on holding the resource will be positive or negative, meaning that the expected rate
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of change in the in situ price of the resource will be greater or smaller than the rate of
interest. This is the formulation of the Hotelling rule which is retained for the empirical
investigation that follows.
2.3 An econometric specification of the stochastic Hotelling rule
In what follows we borrow from recent financial econometrics methods to estimate
the above stochastic Hotelling rule.
We want to estimate the time varying coefficient β (t), which is a measure of the sen-
sitivity of the return on the resource stock to the return on the chosen “market” portfolio.
It will be an indicator of that part of the variance on the return on the resource stock that
cannot be diversified away by investing in the chosen portfolio of assets.
If the values of µS(t) and µM(t) were known, then, given r(t), the value of β (t) could
be easily computed by noting that :
β (t) =
µS(t)− r(t)
µM(t)− r(t) . (2.7)
Thus estimated values µS(t) and µM(t) will provide us with estimated values of β (t).
The rate of return on holding a stock of the resource in the ground is given by the
rate of change in its in situ price, dλ/λ . It is shown in Gaudet and Khadr (1991) that,
given (2.3), it will in equilibrium follow an Itoˆ process of the form :
dλ (t)
λ (t)
= µSdt+σSξS
√
dt, (2.8)
where µS, σS and ξS ∼ N(0,1) are equilibrium values which will depend on the para-
meters, including µi, σi and ξi (i = 1,2) in (2.3). Notice that those equilibrium values
will fluctuate randomly over time, even if µi, σi were not functions of θi, since they will
depend on ξi.
In order to specify an estimable form, it is useful to reformulate (2.8) in terms of the
cumulative return on the in situ resource stock, RS(t) =
∫ t
0 dλ (s)/λ (s). We can use its
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infinitesimal variation dRS(t) = dλ (t)/λ (t) to rewrite (2.8) as
dRS(t) = µS(t,RS(t))dt+σS(t,RS(t))dζS(t), (2.9)
where the drift and the variance coefficients are now expressed explicitly in terms of
time and of RS(t) and where dζS(t) = ξS(t)
√
t, with ξS ∼ N(0,1).
Similarly, the stochastic process for the cumulative return on the market portfolio,
RM(t), is given by :
dRM(t) = µM(t,RM(t))dt+σM(t,RM(t))dζM(t). (2.10)
The commonly used strategy to estimate this stochastic process consists first in speci-
fying a functional form for both the drift and the diffusion coefficients and, second, in
discretizing the stochastic process in order to estimate the parameters from observed
data, which are typically recorded discretely over a certain time interval [0,T].
Consequently, we consider a specific class of continuous time diffusion processes
known as the CKLS model (see Chan et al. 1992) and defined as follows :
dR(t) = (α1+α2R(t))dt+σR(t)α3dζ (t). (2.11)
This model therefore adopts a linear function of time for the drift and a power function
for the volatility. Equation (2.11) allows the conditional mean and variance to depend
on the level of R(t), which is the cumulative return on the stock of the resource. The
parameters α1 and α2 are the unknown drift and mean reversion structural parameters,
σ is the volatility parameter and α3 is the proportional conditional volatility exponent.
Constraining some parameters of the CKLS form to take specific values leads to
some well known models, which are summarized in the following table :
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Model α1 α2 α3 σ
Unconstrained (CKLS) dR(t) = (α1+α2R(t))dt+σR(t)α3dζ (t)
Brennan and Schwartz (1980) dR(t) = (α1+α2R(t))dt+σR(t)dζ (t) 1
Constant Elasticity of Variance dR(t) = α2R(t)dt+σR(t)α3dζ (t) 0
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process dR(t) = α2R(t)dt+σdζ (t) 0 0
The general CKLS specification in (2.11) facilitates the construction of a discrete
time version. The discrete approximation of the continuous time diffusion process deve-
loped by Nowman (1997) and based on some results found in Bergstrom (1983) is given
by :
Rt = eα2Rt−1+
α1
α2
(eα2−1)+ηt , (2.12)
where the error term ηt satisfies :
E(ηsηt) =

0 if s 6= t
σ2
2α2
(e2α2−1)R2α3t−1 if s = t.
Define L(α1,α2,α3,σ) as the logarithm of the likelihood function of the model :
L(α1,α2,α3,σ) =
T
∑
t=1
[
logE(η2t )+
(Rt− eα2Rt−1− α1α2 (eα2−1))2
E(η2t )
]
+ constant term
with E(η2t ) as defined above. Maximum Likelihood Estimation consists in solving for
(α̂1, α̂2, α̂3, σ̂) = argmax
α1,α2,α3,σ
L(α1,α2,α3,σ)
to get estimates of the unknown parameters in the drift and diffusion coefficients. The
method is a sort of quasi-maximum method since (2.12) is not the true discrete model
corresponding to equation (2.11), but is merely a conditional Gaussian approximation.
In so doing, this method replaces a non-Gaussian process by an approximate Gaussian
one.
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The estimated drift of the return on the natural resource is then given by
µ̂S(t) = α̂S1 + α̂
S
2 R
S(t),
while that on the return on the market portfolio is given by
µ̂M(t) = α̂M1 + α̂
M
2 R
M(t).
The estimated “short-run” beta can then be computed as :
β̂ (t) =
µ̂S(t)− r(t)
µ̂M(t)− r(t)
, (2.13)
where r(t) is the risk free rate.
We define a “long-run” beta over the period [0,T] as :
β =
[
∑Tt=1(µS(t)− r(t))
T
]
[
∑Tt=1(µM(t)− r(t))
T
] . (2.14)
Notice that if we substitute for µS(t)−r(t) from (2.6), β can be rewritten in the following
way :
β¯ = ∑
T
t=1βt [µM(t)− r(t)]
∑Tt=1 [µM(t)− r(t)]
(2.15)
which is a weighted average of the betas over the interval [0,T ], with the weights given
by [µM(t)− r(t)]/∑Tt=1 [µM(t)− r(t)].
A point estimate of the long-run beta (2.15) is then given by
̂¯β = ∑Tt=1 β̂ (t) [µ̂M(t)− r(t)]
∑Tt=1
[
µ̂M(t)− r(t)
] . (2.16)
In what follows, we adopt an approach similar to that of Lucas (1978); Breeden
(1979); Hansen and Singleton (1983); Mankiw and Shapiro (1986), who use the consump-
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tion growth risk (or consumption beta) to measure the riskiness of an asset. The betas
will be measured relative to consumption growth rather than the market portfolio index.
This is analogous to the equations (2.6), (2.13), (2.14) with the expected return on the
market portfolio µM replaced by the expected rate of growth in consumption µC. In this
case the beta is the conditional covariance between the return on the resource asset and
the consumption growth. A nonrenewable resource asset is more risky if it pays less
when consumption is low.
2.4 Market capitalization and the rate of return on the in-situ resource stocks
One way for individual investors to invest in nonrenewable reserves (such as oil or
coal) is to buy stocks in the companies that hold those reserves. However, at any moment
of time, the stock market value of those companies will reflect their holdings not only
of in situ stocks of the nonrenewable resource, but also of some reproducible assets. Let
K(t) represent the stock of capital held at date t in the form of those other assets. If we
denote by ν(t) the value of a unit of that capital, then, if the company owns reserves in
the quantity S(t), valued at λ (t), the company’s market capitalization can be written :
Π(t) = λ (t)S(t)+ν(t)K(t) (2.17)
= [λ (t)+ γ(t)ν(t)]S(t), (2.18)
where γ(t) = K(t)/S(t) is the ratio of fixed capital to reserves.
In the absence of reasonable measures of the evolution over time of γ(t) and ν(t) we
will assume them to be constant. It follows that :
dΠ(t)
Π(t)
=
dλ (t)
λ (t)
[
λ (t)
λ (t)+ γν
]
+
dS(t)
S(t)
(2.19)
and hence :
dRS(t) =
dλ (t)
λ (t)
=
(
1+
γν
λ (t)
)(
dΠ(t)
Π(t)
− dS(t)
S(t)
)
. (2.20)
The return on the resource stock is therefore proportional to the difference between the
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rate of change in the company’s capitalization and the rate of change in its reserves. The
factor of proportionality (1+(γν)/λ (t)) is a decreasing function of λ (t), but is always
positive. In the absence of observations on λ (t), it therefore seems reasonable to use
dΠ(t)
Π(t)
− dS(t)
S(t)
(2.21)
as a proxy for the return on the resource stock for estimation purposes, since they both
must move in the same direction. This is what will done in the estimations that follow.
2.5 The data
2.5.1 Oil
The data used to compute the proxy (2.21) for oil are presented in this subsection.
We need data on market capitalization and on reserves. The data on market capitali-
zations comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, on a
monthly basis for the period 1959(2)-2006(12). 2 The data on reserves comes from the
BP Statistics web site, on a yearly basis for the period 1959-2006. 3
The proxy (2.21) for the change in the cumulative return of the oil reserves at date t
can be computed in discrete time as follows :
∆Roilτ =
[
∑Nτn=1 X
oil
n,τ
∑Nτ−1n=1 X
oil
n,τ−1
−1
]
−
[
Sτ
Sτ−1
−1
]
(2.22)
where τ ∈ {1959(2), ...,2006(12)}, Xoiln,τ is the market capitalization of oil company n at
date τ and Nτ the total number of companies at that date. The number Nτ changes over
time as the number of companies present on the stock exchange changes. The number of
companies in the sample retained for this study varies between 5 and 56 over the period
of observation. 4 Sτ is the level of world proven oil reserves at date τ . The first term of
2. The CRSP (http ://www.crsp.com) provides a comprehensive database on NYSE, AMEX and NAS-
DAQ stock markets.
3. See www.bp.com
4. A change in the number of companies can be because of the split of an existing company, the entry
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this formula reflects the rate of change in the market capitalization of the oil sector and
the second term reflects the change in the proven oil reserve.
The 56 oil companies that were at one time or another part of the sample are listed
in Table 1 of the Appendix I.1. 5 They include some of the biggest companies owning
oil reserves : 39 of them are listed in the top 100 World Oil Companies. 6 The other
seventeen are companies in the CRSP database that have an important current market
capitalization and are quoted on US stock exchanges for at least 5 years. Figure 1 shows
the evolution of the first term of (2.22), which is the monthly growth rate in the index of
market capitalization of the oil companies.
Figure 2.1 – Growth rate of the market capitalization of oil companies
of a new company, the merger of two existing companies or the exit of an existing company. Taking into
account all of those changes assures the coherence of the index over time.
5. All of the 56 companies are classified under US Department of Labor SIC number 1311 (Crude
petroleum and natural gas).
6. See Energy Intelligence (2006), “The Energy Intelligence Top 100 : Ranking the World’s Oil Com-
panies” (htt p : //www.energyintel.com/publicationdetail.asp?publicationid = 124). The 61 other com-
panies in the top 100 were not listed on the US stock exchange, which is a prerequisite for being retained
in our sample.
36
Due to unavailability of data on oil reserves held by the companies in the sample
over a sufficiently long period of time, we use data on world’s oil proven reserves as its
proxy. 7
The data on world proven oil reserves are from the web site of BP Statistics. Since it
is annual in frequency and the market capitalization data is monthly, we need to compute
the monthly equivalent of the annual proven reserves. To do this we use an interpolation
technique for deriving a monthly series from annual data (see Lisman and Sandee (1964);
Boot et al. (1967)). The method generates estimated monthly reserves that are consistent
with the annual series on proven reserves. It generates the estimated monthly reserves
series by solving the following constrained quadratic minimization problem :
min
12k
∑
i=2
(
si− si−1
)2
s.t.
12k
∑
i=12k−11
si = St , (t = 1,2, ..,k) (2.23)
where k is the number of annual observations, S is the annual proven reserve, and s is the
estimated monthly proven reserve. The result is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2.2 – Growth rate of the oil world proved reserves
7. There could be a positive correlation between the evolution of the world’s oil proven reserves and
the evolution of the total oil proven reserves held by these firms. Thirty nine companies in the sample are
listed in the top 100 largest operators that account for more that 85% of world’s oil proven reserves.
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The proxy for the cumulative return on the reserves can then be calculated as :
Roilt =
t
∑
τ=0
∆Roilτ +R
oil
0 (2.24)
where ∆Roilτ is given by equation (2.22). Figure 3 plots the evolution over time of this
proxy for the cumulative return on oil reserves.
Figure 2.3 – Proxy of the cumulative returns of the oil in the ground (Roilt )
2.5.2 Coal
The CRSP database contains nine coal companies extracting coal and which are lis-
ted on the US Stock Exchange. We have constructed the growth rate of market capitali-
zation of mining companies engaged in the coal exploitation and which are in the CRSP
data base.
The proxy (2.21) for the change in the cumulative return on in situ coal at date t can
be computed in discrete time using the following formula :
∆Rcoalτ =
[
∑Nτn=1 X
Coal
n,τ
∑Nτ−1n=1 X
Coal
n,τ−1
−1
]
−
[
Sτ
Sτ−1
−1
]
where τ ∈{1986(2), ...,2006(12)}, where Xcoaln,τ denotes market capitalization of the coal
mining company n at date τ and Nτ the number of companies changes over time to take
into account the number of coal companies present on stock exchange (1≤ Nt ≤ 9 ).
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Figure 2.4 – Growth rate of the market capitalization of coal companies
Data on world proved reserves of coal cover the period 1986 to 2006 and are taken
from the web site of BP statistics. These are annual which were converted to monthly
data, using the same technique as for oil reserves.
Figure 2.5 – Growth rate of the coal world proved reserves
39
The cumulative return of the resource in the ground is given by
Rcoalt =
t
∑
τ=0
∆Rcoalτ +R
coal
0 (2.25)
Using this proxy, the following graphics give an idea of the evolution of the cumulative
return of the coal in the ground
Figure 2.6 – Proxy of the cumulative returns of the coal in the ground (Rcoalt )
2.5.3 The risk free rate
For the risk-free rate of interest, we use the monthly equivalent of the annual rate on
the one-month U.S. Treasury bill, taken from the CRSP database. The data ranges from
February 1959 to December 2006.
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Figure 2.7 – One-month U.S Treasury bill
2.5.3.1 Consumption
Data on consumption are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank and cover the
period February 1959 to December 2006. We used monthly per capita consumption of
services and non-durable goods.
Figure 2.8 – Growth rate of per-capita consumption
41
2.6 Estimating the stochastic Hotelling rule
2.6.1 The short-run betas and the long-run beta for the in situ oil asset
The estimation of the stochastic process for the returns on the in situ oil asset was
conducted using different specifications of the CKLS models, but only the Brennan and
Schwartz (1980) model
(
α3 = 1
)
, given by :
dR(t) = (α1+α2R(t))dt+σR(t)dζ (t) (2.26)
performed well. 8 The estimations are presented in the following table :
α̂oil1 α̂
oil
2 ln(σ̂oil)
0.0530 0.6467 2.4235
(4.7095) (1.7278) (10.5996)
(2.27)
All the t-student’s coefficients in brackets suggest statistical significance at 10% level.
Suppose that the logarithm of consumption also follows the following stochastic pro-
cess :
d log(c(t)) = µ(t, log(c(t))dt+σ(t, log(c(t)))dζ (t), (2.28)
where µ(.) and σ() are two scalars measuring respectively the mean and standard de-
viation of the change in log of consumption.
We estimated the stochastic process for the rate of growth of consumption using
different specifications of the CKLS models, but only the Geometric brownian model
dRc(t) = (α2Rc(t))dt+σRc(t)α3dζ (t) (2.29)
performed well. The parameters are estimated from 48 years of monthly data (575 obser-
vations). The results of the estimation of the diffusion parameters of the rate of growth
8. Among the unrestricted model and the models obtained from imposing the restrictions described at
page 6, it is the specification which provides the greatest number of statistically significant coefficients
including the second parameter α2
42
of consumption are reported in the table below. Estimated t-values are shown in paren-
theses.
α̂c2 α̂
c
3 ln(σ̂ c)
0.0006 -1.4738 -6.2806
(11.7793) (-5.2675) (-129.5582)
(2.30)
The estimated beta coefficients are given by :
β̂ oil,C(t) =
α̂oil1 + α̂
oil
2 R
oil(t)− r(t)
α̂c2 Rc(t)− r(t)
(2.31)
Figure 2.9 – Short-run beta for in situ oil over the period 1959(2) to 2006(12)
From the expression (2.16), it follows that the estimated value of the long-run beta
is
β̂ oil =
∑Tt=1 β̂ oil,C(t)
[
α̂c2 R
c(t)− r(t)
]
∑Tt=1
[
α̂c2 Rc(t)− r(t)
] =−3.54 < 0. (2.32)
In order to give a confidence interval to the long run beta (2.15) which is a ratio
parameter. Building a confidence interval for a parameter ratio is not easy due to the
problem of the overdiversification of the model. The denominator can be equal to zero
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for example, causing the interval to be unbounded. We follow the Bolduc et al. (2007)
approach to build the confidence interval for long run beta. They use a procedure which
combines the parametric bootstrap, the Fieller method, and the Delta Method. See Ap-
pendix I.2 for more details on this procedure. Using this procedure, it follows that the
95% Bootstrap Fieller confidence interval for the long-run beta β̂ oil is FC = [−∞,+∞].
It appears the Fieller confidence interval which is unbounded is less informative than the
95% Bootstrap Delta confidence interval for the long-run beta β̂ oil which is
DC = [−4.8;0.6512].
This result suggests that oil in the ground is an asset providing insurance against
fluctuations in consumption in the long run. Investing in oil in the ground is a good
hedge against the market risk in the long run.
2.6.2 The short-run betas and long-run beta for the in situ coal asset
The estimation of the stochastic process for the return on the in situ coal asset was
conducted using different specifications of the CKLS models but only the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process
(
α1 = 0,α3 = 0
)
given by
dR(t) = α2R(t)dt+σdζ (t) (2.33)
performed well.
The parameters are estimated using 22 years of monthly data (253 observations). The
results of the estimation of the diffusion parameters of the cumulative return on coal in
the ground are reported in following table :
α̂Coal2 ln(σ̂Coal)
0.0040 -1.5366
( 2.4661 ) (-34.4313)
(2.34)
The estimations of the stochastic process for the consumption growth rate was conduc-
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ted using different specifications of the CKLS models, but only the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process given by
dRc(t)) = α2Rc(t)dt+σdζ (t) (2.35)
performed well. 9 The estimations are presented in the following table. T-students’s va-
lues are in brackets.
α̂c2 ln(σ̂ c)
0.0005 -6.7085
(8.7577 ) (-149.8206)
(2.36)
The expression of estimated short-run betas are given by :
β̂ coal,C(t) =
α̂coal2 R
coal(t)− r(t)
α̂c2 Rc(t)− r(t)
. (2.37)
From expression (2.16), it follows that the estimated value of the long-run beta is
β̂ coal =
∑Tt=1 β̂ coal,C(t)
[
α̂c2 R
c(t)− r(t)
]
∑Tt=1
[
α̂c2 Rc(t)− r(t)
] =−2.0844 < 0. (2.38)
9. The specification that performed best is different than in the case of oil because the period of obser-
vation is different.
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Figure 2.10 – Short-run beta for in situ coal over the period 1985(2) to 2006(12)
The 95% Bootstrap Fieller confidence interval for the long-run beta β̂ coal obtained
from the the procedure described in the Appendix I.2 is not informative. But the 95%
Bootstrap Delta confidence interval for the long-run beta β̂ coal is bounded and yields
DC = [−4.26;1.051].
As for oil, the point estimation of the long-run beta coefficient is negative, which
suggests that, as for oil, coal in the ground as an asset can constitute an insurance against
long-run fluctuations in consumption.
From these results, oil in the ground or coal in the ground asset can be used to hedge
against risk in the long run. A long-run investor wanting to make a long-term strategy of
hedging against risk may include them in his portfolio.
2.7 Concluding comments
Building on the natural resource economic model of Gaudet and Khadr (1991), this
paper has investigated empirically the role of nonrenewable natural resource stocks in
a context of risk diversification. In doing so, we have formally shown how the market
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capitalization of mining companies and the world proved reserves can be used in the
construction of a proxy for the return on holding reserves of natural resources. We have
estimated a stochastic version of the Hotelling rule of exhaustible resource exploitation
and used it to infer on the riskiness of investment in oil and coal reserves. The empirical
results indicate that investing in oil or coal reserves is a good hedge against risk in the
long run. The negative long-run beta coefficients mean that the return on holding oil
or coal as assets tends to vary inversely with changes in the market, as captured by
the relative change in consumption. In that sense they are both non risky assets relative
to the market and constitute a form of insurance against adverse changes changes in
consumption.
CHAPITRE 3
FUTURE PROSPECTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCE ASSETS
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study the evolution of exhaustible natural resource prices
using a continuous time setting that merges the stochastic differential utility framework
of Duffie and Epstein (1992b) and the natural resource model of Gaudet and Khadr
(1991). In doing so, this paper highlights the role played in determining the equili-
brium rate of depletion of a nonrenewable natural resource stock by an endogenous risk-
adjusted and state dependent discount rate and by another factor related to the growth
rate of future utility.
Using a standard linear additive intertemporal utility framework in a model with ex-
traction, production, and consumption under stochastic investments opportunities, Gau-
det and Khadr (1991) showed that the pricing of a nonrenewable resource stock must
take into account an insurance factor against adverse changes in current consumption.
But despite its usefulness in tackling many decisions under uncertainty, the standard
additive utility framework does not allow the consumer to care about future prospects.
Other well-known weaknesses of the standard additive utility, such as its inability to di-
sentangle risk aversion and intertemporal substitution, and some related consequences in
natural resource management have also received attention, including in Shaw and Wood-
ward (2008), Howitt et al. (2005), Knapp and Olson (1996), Peltola and Knapp (2001)
and Epaulard and Pommeret (2003).
A continuous time framework allowing consumer preferences to account for future
utility is the stochastic differential utility. The future utility index is made a function of
the distribution of future consumption ; as noted by Duffie and Epstein (1992a, p.425), a
larger future utility index represents an increase in future prospects. The stochastic dif-
ferential utility framework captures the notion that one’s present sense of well-being can
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depend on one’s expected future utility levels in a not necessarily risk-neutral manner.
The stochastic differential utility is the continuous time version of the discrete time re-
cursive preferences of Epstein and Zin (1989) and it includes the standard additive utility
as a special case.
A convenient way to understand how future utility affects the intertemporal decision
making process is to analyze the growth rate of marginal utility (similar to the intertem-
poral marginal rate of substitution in discrete time). With a standard utility, the growth
rate of marginal utility depends only on the current consumption growth. The only source
of risk is associated with shocks to current consumption growth. With a stochastic dif-
ferential utility, the growth rate of marginal utility depends on both the growth rate of
consumption and the growth rate of the future utility index. The two sources of risk are
related to the current consumption growth and the growth rate of the future utility index.
These findings may have implications in natural resource economics since exhaus-
tible natural resources are used as energy sources and as inputs in the production process
of consumption goods and services. Holding nonrenewable resource stock can be risky
not only regarding the growth of current consumption but also regarding future prospects
as represented by the future utility index.
To investigate these aspects related to future prospects in analyzing the price path of
an exhaustible resource stock, this paper merges two ideas : the stochastic differential
utility framework by Duffie and Epstein (1992b) and the Gaudet and Khadr (1991) fra-
mework, where the arrival of the information on the state of the economy is governed by
two stochastic productivity processes. A more general formulation of the Hotelling rule
is derived which includes the insurance factor found by Gaudet and Khadr (1991), plus
a new factor related to the role of future prospects and an endogenous discount rate. It is
shown how future prospects are a determinant of the market price of the resource above
ground. It is also shown that, contrary to the case of a reproducible asset, an endogenous
discount rate plays a crucial role in determining the pricing of a nonrenewable resource
stock.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main features of the sto-
chastic differential utility. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 derives the general
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formulation of the Hotelling rule and discusses it. The final section offers concluding
comments.
3.2 Stochastic differential utility
The stochastic differential utility is the extension of the notion of recursive utility in
a continuous time setting. In this section, I will present its main features.
The stochastic differential utility is identified by a pair of functions ( f ∗,A∗) called
an aggregator, where A∗ is local risk aversion and f ∗ represents the relative preference
between immediate consumption and the certainty equivalent of utility derived from fu-
ture consumption. It determines the degree of intertemporal substitution of consumption
and also generates collateral risk attitudes under uncertainty. Given f ∗(·), risk attitudes
are encapsulated by the function A∗(·) which has no effect on intertemporal substitution.
The more negative is A∗(·), the more risk averse is the agent. For a given consumption
process, denote by J ∗(t) the continuation utility attributable to future consumption
streams given the current information information available at date t. 1 The continuation
utility is defined recursively by the following stochastic integral equation :
J ∗(t) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
(
f ∗[c(s),J (s)]+
A∗[J ∗(s)]σ2J ∗(s)
2
)
ds
]
(3.1)
where σ2J∗(t) is the utility volatility process, and Et denotes the conditional expectation
given the information available at date t.
Any stochastic differential utility with aggregator ( f ∗,A∗) could be represented by an
ordinarily equivalent normalized aggregator ( f ,0) whose variance multiplier is such that
A = 0. The normalized aggregator ( f ,0) is more tractable for proofs and optimization
resolution, while the unnormalized aggregator ( f ∗,A∗) is convenient for achieving the
desired disentangling by changing A∗() with f ∗() fixed. With the normalized aggregator,
1. The continuation utility is similar to the prospective utility in the discrete time setting of Koopmans
(1960, p.292)
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the time t continuation utility becomes
J (t) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
f
(
c(s),J (s)
)
ds
]
(3.2)
Notice that with a stochastic differential utility, the growth rate of marginal utility
depends on both the growth rate of consumption and the growth rate of the future uti-
lity index. The instantaneous utility is f (c(t),J(t)). The growth rate of instantaneous
marginal utility can be decomposed into the sum of two terms as follows :
d fc(c(t),J (t))
fc(c(t),J (t))
=
c(t) fcc
fc
[
dc(t)
c(t)
]
+
J (t) fcJ
fc
[
dJ (t)
J (t)
]
. (3.3)
The future utility index (or prospective utility) J (t) is made a function of the distri-
bution of future consumption. The growth rate of the future utility index represents the
updates in expectations about the future prospects. 2
Given the current information available on the state of the economy, a positive growth
of the future utility index may be interpreted as brighter future prospects. If the growth
of the future utility index is negative, it may be viewed as a worsening future prospects.
In this case, it represents an increase in the probability of low levels of consumption in
the entire future. With stochastic differential utility, there are two sources of risk : one
associated with the current consumption growth and another associated with the growth
rate of the future utility index or future growth prospects.
Future prospects may be particularly relevant in the management of natural resources,
which by its very nature is a long-term process. During this long-term process, the cur-
rent information on the state of the economy may lead to revisions in expectations about
the future prospects and then affect the resource extraction strategies.
An example of parametric stochastic differential utility for which existence has been
2. In discrete time, an alternative intuitive framework by Koszegi and Rabin (2009, p.4) considers that
current instantaneous utility depends on current consumption and a “prospective gain-loss utility” which
derives from changes between last period and the current period in beliefs regarding future outcomes.
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established by Schroder and Skiadas (1999) is given by the following integral equation :
J ∗(t) = Et
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)
[
c(s)γ
γ
+
αJ ∗(s)−1
2
σ2J ∗(s)
]
ds (3.4)
where the coefficient ρ denotes time preference and the coefficient 1γ denotes the elasti-
city of intertemporal substitution. Schroder and Skiadas (1999) show that its correspon-
ding normalized aggregator is given by
f (c(s),J (s)) = (1+α)
[
c(s)γ
γ
J (s)
α
1+α −ρJ (s)
]
, (3.5)
with the parameters satisfying the following constraints :
α >−1 ,γ 6= 0 ,γ < min
{
1,
1
1+α
}
(3.6)
Note that the case where the coefficient α = 0 means that the agent pays no attention
to the uncertainty of the continuation utility, in which case (3.4) corresponds to the
standard additive utility and the aggregator (3.5) becomes linearly dependent upon the
future utility. A positive or negative value coefficient α can be viewed as a measure of
the risk aversion, when compared to the time additive utility.
When γ > 0, a negative α penalizes uncertainty about future utility, whereas a posi-
tive α rewards uncertainty about future utility. Hence the agent is said to be comparati-
vely more risk-averse (relative to the time-separable utility) if γ > 0 and α < 0, whereas
the agent is said to be comparatively less risk-averse (relative to the time-separable uti-
lity) if γ > 0 and α > 0. When γ < 0, the effect of the sign of α on the uncertainty
of future utility is reversed. When γ = 0, the aggregator becomes f (c(s),J (s)) =
(1+αJs)
[
log(c(s))− ρα log(1+αJ (s))
]
and the interpretation of α is the same as
in the case of γ > 0
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3.3 The model
Our baseline framework modifies the Gaudet and Khadr (1991) natural resource mo-
del, which uses a linear additive utility framework, to allow preferences of the consumer
to be represented by a stochastic differential utility. We first describe the Gaudet and
Khadr (1991) framework.
3.3.1 The Gaudet-Khadr framework
In the Gaudet and Khadr (1991) economy there are two goods, one of which is a
nonrenewable natural resource, whose stock at date t, S(t), is irreversibly reduced by
extraction. The other is a reproducible composite good, that can be either consumed
or accumulated. If accumulated, it can be either in the form of physical capital, whose
accumulated stock is denoted K(t), or of a “bond”. The accumulated stock of bonds is
assumed to reproduce itself at an exogenously given risk free rate r(t), which represents
the force of interest.
Both the production of the composite good and the extraction of the natural resource
are assumed to be stochastic. More precisely, if y(t) denotes the flow of production of the
composite good, x(t) denotes the flow of extraction of the resource and θ1(t) and θ2(t)
are two stochastic productivity indices, then the stochastic production and extraction
processes are represented respectively by
y(t) = F(Ky(t),x(t),θ1(t)) (3.7)
and
x(t) = G(Kx(t),θ2(t)) =
Kx(t)
γ(θ2(t))
, (3.8)
where Ky(t)+Kx(t) = K(t).
The production of the composite good is assumed to satisfy FK > 0, Fx > 0, FKK < 0
and Fxx < 0, and the Inada conditions with respect to the inputs Ky and x . It also assumed
to satisfy F1 > 0, FK1 > 0 and Fx1 > 0, where the subscript 1 denotes the derivative
with respect to θ1. The function γ(θ2) represents the number of units of capital required
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to extract a unit of the natural resource and satisfies γ ′(θ2) > 0, limθ2→−∞ γ(θ2) = ∞,
limθ2→∞ γ(θ2) = 0.
The productivity indices θ1 and θ2 are assumed to evolve over time according to Itoˆ
processes of the form :
dθi = µidt+σiξi
√
dt, i = 1,2, (3.9)
with ξi ∼ N(0,1), cov(dθ1,dθ2) = σ12dt + o(dt) and σ12 = σ1σ2cov(ξ1,ξ2). The drift
µi and the variance σi can depend on time and on the state.
Producers of the composite commodity adjust instantaneously their stock of capital
and their use of the nonrenewable resource to maximize profits at each date t. Since the
producers take prices as given, the following conditions arise
FK(Ky(t),x(t),θ1(t)) = r(t) (3.10)
Fx(Ky(t),x(t),θ1(t)) = p(t) (3.11)
The first equation says that in equilibrium the producers ensure that the marginal product
of the stock of the composite good is the same in each of its uses. The second equation
says that in equilibrium the producers choose the level of the natural resource input
such that its marginal product equals its marginal cost which is the price of the resource
extracted.
The dynamic programming problem of the resource extraction sector is to choose the
extraction path that maximizes the expected present value of the future net benefits :
max
x(s),s∈[t,∞]
Et
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)q(τ)[p(s)− rγ(θ2(s))]x(s)ds (3.12)
subject to :
dS(t) =−x(t)dt and S(0) = S0,
where ρ is instantaneous time-invariant discount rate, p(t) represents the gross price of
a unit of the resource in the ground, expressed in units of the composite commodity, and
q(t) denotes the demand price of a unit of the composite commodity, taken as given, as
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is θ2(t). It is shown in Gaudet and Khadr (1991) that this requires :
1
q(t)λ (t)
1
dt
Etd[q(t)λ (t)] = ρ (3.13)
where λ (t) = p(t)− rγ(θ2(t)) is the price of a unit of the resource in the ground. The
expression q(t)λ (t) is the marginal profit from extracting the resource expressed in term
of the composite good. The partial equilibrium rule (3.13) says that the resource produ-
cers’ optimal extraction rule requires that the expected marginal profit from extraction
increase at the constant rate ρ .
The representative consumer derives instantaneous utility U(c(t)) from consuming
the flow c(t) of the composite good and is the ultimate owner of the stock of composite
good and the stock of the natural resource. Given θ1 and θ2, he chooses at each date his
consumption and the allocation of his wealth between the resource stock and the accu-
mulated composite good so as to maximize his discounted flow of future instantaneous
utility, that is
max
{c(s),ω(s)},s∈[t,∞]
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)U(c(s))ds
subject to his stochastic wealth constraint. The decision variable ω(t) is the fraction
of his wealth held in the form of the composite commodity, the rest being invested in
the resource stock. His consumption and portfolio decisions generate consumption and
asset demands, through which he sends price signals to the resource firms and the firms
producing the composite good. The firms take those demand prices as given in making
their extraction and production decisions, which in turn generate the asset returns that
the consumer takes as given when establishing his opportunity set, as determined by his
wealth constraint. The prices and asset returns are taken to be those that simultaneously
equilibrate the markets and are shown to follow Itoˆ processes, whose drifts and variances
are derived from the market equilibrium conditions.
The value of a unit of resource in the ground, λ (t) = p(t)− rγ(θ2(t), is the price of
the extracted resource minus the marginal cost of extraction. Gaudet and Khadr (1991)
show that, given (3.9), the value of a unit of resource in the ground, λ (t), will in equili-
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brium follow an Itoˆ process of the form :
dλ (t)
λ (t)
= µSdt+σSdζ (t), (3.14)
where µS(t) and σS(t) are equilibrium values which will depend on the parameters, in-
cluding µi, σi (i = 1,2) in (3.9). The drift µS(t) = 1λ (t)
1
dt Etdλ (t) represents the expected
instantaneous rate of return on the resource stock being held in the ground. The volatility
of the nonrenewable resource returns, σS(t), induces time variation in investment oppor-
tunities. The returns on both the capital stock r(t) and the resource stock dλ (t)λ (t) constitute
the signals that the consumer uses in its optimal portfolio decision making.
3.3.2 The investment decision with a stochastic differential utility
Assume now that the consumer’s preferences are generated by the stochastic diffe-
rential utility of Duffie and Epstein (1992b) instead of the linear additive utility assumed
in Gaudet and Khadr (1991). The representative consumer’s decision problem is then
formalized as follows :
max
c(t),(1−ω(t))
Et
[∫ ∞
t
f (c(s),J (s))ds
]
(3.15)
subject to the wealth constraint :
dW (t) =−c(t)dt+W (t)
[
ω(t)r(t)+(1−ω(t))dλ (t)
λ (t)
]
, (3.16)
where the consumer’s total stock of wealth at date t is W (t) = K(t)+B(t)+λ (t)S(t),
λ (t) being the price of the in-ground resource in terms of the composite good. The
fraction
(
1−ω(t)) of wealth is invested in the nonrenewable natural resource risky asset
at date t, with return dλ (t)/λ (t), and the rest in the accumulated composite good, with
return r(t).
Denote by J(θ1,θ2,W (t)) the maximized utility of the representative consumer in
state (θ1,θ2) with wealth W (t) at time t. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of the
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consumption portfolio choice problem described above is then given by :
0 = sup
c,(1−ω)
[ f (c(s),J(θ1,θ2,W (t))+D J(θ1,θ2,W (t))] , (3.17)
where DJ(·) = 1dt EtdJ(·) is the drift coefficient of the Itoˆ process J(·). In other words,
DJ(θ1,θ2,W (t)) =
1
dt
EtdJ(θ1,θ2,W (t) (3.18)
= J1µ1+ J2µ2+ JW
[
W (1−ω)[µS− r]+Wr− c
]
+
1
2
[
2J11σ211+2J22σ
2
22
+ 2J12σ12+2W (1−ω)(J1Wσ1S+ J2Wσ2S)+ JWW (1−w)2W 2σ2S
]
,
where Ji denotes the derivative of J with respect to θi and Ji j denotes the cross-derivative
with respect to θi and θ j.
The first-order condition with respect to consumption c is :
JW = fc. (3.19)
The first-order condition with respect to the portfolio decision (1−ω) is :
JWW (µS− r)+ JWWσ2S (1−ω(t))W 2+W
[
J1WWσ1S+ J2WWσ2S
]
= 0. (3.20)
Differentiating the maximized Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (3.17) with res-
pect to W and applying the envelope theorem yields :
fJ(c,J)JW =−∂DJ∂W . (3.21)
Using the first-order condition (3.20) into the expression of the right-hand side obtained
by differentiating (3.18) gives (See Appendix A) :
DJW
JW
= fJ(c,J)− r(t). (3.22)
From the first-order condition (3.19) for optimal consumption we may replace JW by
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fc(c,J), to obtain :
1
fc(c(t),J(t))
D fc(c(t),J(t)) =− fJ(c(t),J(t))− r(t), (3.23)
where D fc is the drift coefficient of the Itoˆ process fc(c,J).
The term − fJ(c,J) generalizes the notion of discount rate to the stochastic diffe-
rential utility. 3 Condition (3.23) states that optimal consumption path is such that the
expected rate of change the marginal utility of consumption equals the instantaneous
risk free rate r(t) plus the instantaneous stochastic discount rate.
3.4 The Hotelling rule with stochastic differential utility
Substituting for the inverse demand q(t) = fc(c(t),J(t)) into (3.13), the optimal ex-
traction condition of the representative price-taking resource extracting firm, we get :
1
λ (t) fc(c(t),J(t))
Dλ (t) fc(c(t),J(t)) = ρ, (3.24)
where again the notation Dz = 1dt Etdz is used. Combining (3.24) with condition (3.23),
which must be satisfied by the optimal consumption path, and using the fact that λ (t),
the marginal value of the resource in the ground, must in equilibrium follow the sto-
chastic process (3.14), we obtain the formulation of the Hotelling rule for the stochastic
differential utility framework (See Appendix B for the details of the derivation) :
µS(t)− r(t) = ρ+ fJ(c(t),J(t))− c(t) fcc(t)fc(t) σSc(t)−
J(t) fcJ(t)
fc(t)
σSJ(t) (3.25)
where µS(t) = 1λ (t)
1
dt Etdλ (t) is the expected instantaneous rate of return on the resource
stock being held in the ground, σSc(t) = covt
(
dλ
λ ,
dc
c
)
, and σSJ(t) = covt
(
dλ
λ ,
dJ
J
)
. In
addition to accounting for the already discussed endogenous discount rate encountered
earlier, it takes the form of a so-called “two-beta asset pricing rule”, where each beta is
3. Note that in the case of the standard additive utility, where the aggregator is f (c,J) = u(c)−ρJ, the
discount rate becomes − fJ = ρ .
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associated to a different risk factor. Hence the equilibrium spread between the expected
return on holding the stock of resource in the ground and the risk free rate of interest has
three components : the endogenous discount rate, the covariance between the return on
the resource stock and consumption growth, and the covariance between return on the
natural resource stock and the instantaneous change of the utility index.
Notice that in the case where the aggregator f depends linearly on the future utility J,
that is f (c,J) =U(c)−ρJ, equation (3.25) yields the Hotelling rule derived by Gaudet
and Khadr (1991), namely :
µS(t)− r(t) =−c(t)U
′′(c(t))
U ′(c(t))
σSc(t) (3.26)
This equilibrium condition expresses the pricing equation of the resource stock in the
case where the agent ignores future prospects when making economic decisions at the
margin (i.e., ( fcJ = 0)). Furthermore, if the resource investor is assumed to be risk neutral
(U ′′ = 0), the Hotelling rule becomes
µS(t) = r(t). (3.27)
To understand the role of the discount rate in the management of the resource stock
with a stochastic differential utility, it is useful to analyze the first component. The first
component ρ+ fJ(c(t),J(t)) shows how the discount rate is adjusted over time with the
resource stock valuation. It may also be thought of as the effect of the time valuation in
the resource stock valuation. This effect depends on both the current consumption and
the value function that measures the expected future prospects, given the information on
the state of the economy available at time t. Note that under certainty (σSc(t) = σSJ(t) =
0), the Hotelling rule (3.25) reduces to :
λ˙
λ
= r(t)+ρ+ fJ(c(t),J(t)). (3.28)
The equilibrium expected excess return on the resource stock is equal to the rate of time
preference adjusted to take into account the effect of the irreversible exhaustion of the
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resource stock and the level of capital held by the consumer. Hence if ρ+ fJ(c(t),J(t))≤
0 then λ˙λ ≤ r(t).
The second component is related to the shocks to current consumption growth. It tells
us that holding a nonrenewable resource stock is relatively desirable and will, everything
else the same, require less of a premium, if its return is negatively correlated with the
rate of growth of consumption. The reverse is true if the correlation is positive. Thus
if a nonrenewable resource stock is such that its return tends to be high (low) when
consumption growth tomorrow is high (low), (σSc > 0), holding such resource stock in
one’s portfolio makes it difficult to smooth consumption over states of nature. Therefore,
risk averse investors require a premium over the riskless return to hold this resource
stock, reflecting the investor’s aversion to substitution over states of nature. The reverse
is true if σSc > 0.
The third component is related to the shocks to future growth prospects. Since the va-
lue function utility J(t) is attributable to the entire stream of future consumption stream
{cs : s > t}, the growth rate of the value function captures revisions in expectations
about future prospects. 4 The presence of the covariance between the return on the re-
source stock and the growth rate of the value function in the pricing equation of nonre-
newable resource stocks gives a formal support to Graham-Tomasi et al. (1986, p.244)
who pointed out that resource stocks could be held as a hedging strategy against bad
future prospects.
If a resource stock is such that its return tends to be high (low) when there are good
(bad) news about future prospects, then σSJ > 0. Such a resource stock is not attractive
for investors who are more risk averse ( fcJ < 0) than with the time-separable utility
and they have a negative hedging demand for this resource stock because it tends to
do worse when there is bad news about future prospects. For them, it is an undesirable
feature of holding this resource stock which therefore needs to be compensated through
a relatively higher risk premium. The risk premium is larger the more positive is the
covariance. On the other hand, investors who are less risk averse ( fcJ > 0 ) or in other
4. An intuitive connection can be made between this third term and what has been labeled ”long-run
risk” in a previous empirical literature, including Bansal and Yaron (2004).
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words more aggressive than with the time separable utility have a positive demand for
this resource stock since they are willing to trade off a worse performance when news
is bad for extra performance when news is good. Holding such an asset smoothes the
intertemporal consumption profile. So the more this investor is averse to intertemporal
substitution, the more he is willing to hold this resource stock.
If a resource stock is such that the covariance between its return and the change in the
value function (capturing how future prospects are expected to be) is negative (σSJ < 0),
then the future creates more hedging opportunities for investors who are more risk averse
than under the time-separable utility (− fcJ > 0) and thus makes agents particularly like
the resource stock, which contributes to lower its risk premium.
For further interpretation, it is useful to reexpress (3.25) explicitly in terms of the
variances and the covariance of the stochastic productivity indices θ1 and θ2. To do this,
use the Itoˆ product rule to obtain :
Dλ fc = fcDλ +λD fc+
∂ fc
∂θ1
∂λ
∂θ1
σ21 +
∂ fc
∂θ2
∂λ
∂θ2
σ22 +
[
∂ fc
∂θ2
∂λ
∂θ1
+
∂ fc
∂θ1
∂λ
∂θ2
]
σ12
(3.29)
where
∂ fc
∂θ1
= fccF1+ fcJJ1
∂ fc
∂θ2
= −γ ′
(
xFx fcc
γ
)
+ fcJJ2
∂λ
∂θ1
= Fx1 > 0
∂λ
∂θ2
= −γ ′
(
xFxx
γ
+ r
)
.
Substituting from (3.29) into (3.24) and using (3.23) yields :
1
λ (t)dt
Et(dλ )− r(t) = ρ+ fJ(c(t),J(t))
− fcc(t)
λ (t) fc(t)
ΨF(σ1,σ2,σ12)− fcJ(t)λ (t) fc(t)ΨJ(σ1,σ2,σ12)(3.30)
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where
ΨF(σ1,σ2,σ12) =
[
F1σ21 −
γ ′
γ
xFxσ12
]
∂λ
∂θ1
+
[
F1σ12− γ
′
γ
xFxσ22
]
∂λ
∂θ2
(3.31)
and, recalling that Ji = ∂J∂θi , i = 1,2,
ΨJ(σ1,σ2,σ12) =
[
J1σ21 + J2σ12
] ∂λ
∂θ1
+
[
J1σ12+ J2σ22
] ∂λ
∂θ2
. (3.32)
The term fccλ fcΨF expresses the risk related to current production and consumption
decisions. An interpretation of this term is provided in Gaudet and Khadr (1991, p. 450).
The term fcJλ fcΨJ is related to the changes in future prospects. Note that the signs of
the coefficients in (3.32) depend crucially, among other things, on the signs of J1 and J2.
For the sake of argument, assume that J1 > 0 and J2 > 0. This means that improvements
in productivity in both the resource extraction sector and the production sector cause
future prospects to become brighter.
Assume σ12(t) > 0. This means that favorable (unfavorable) changes in the pro-
ductivity in the resource extraction sector are associated with unfavorable (favorable)
changes in the productivity in the composite good sector. 5 Assume also ∂λ∂θ2 > 0, so that
productivity improvements in the nonrenewable resource sector decrease the value of the
marginal unit of resource held in the ground. If fcJ < 0, the consumer may be said averse
to risk related to future prospects. Since the uncertainty in both the resource extraction
sector and the production sector go in opposite directions, this resource stock will be
considered more desirable for such consumers than it would be under the standard uti-
lity. Consequently, they require a lower risk premium on the resource stock. Indeed, in
this case, the term fcJλ fcΨJ enters negatively in the risk premium of the resource stock. On
the other hand, if fcJ > 0 then holding such a resource stock is relatively undesirable and
as a consequence a higher risk premium will be required.
In contrast, assume σ12(t)< 0, which means that favorable (unfavorable) changes in
5. Recall that the specifications of the production functions F(Ky,x,θ1) of the composite good sector
and G(Kx,θ2) of the resource extraction sector are such that F1 > 0 while G2 =−γ ′x/γ < 0, i.e. an increase
in θ2 has a negative effect on the productivity of the resource sector.
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the productivity of the resource extraction sector are associated with favorable (unfavo-
rable) changes in the composite good sector. Then, keeping unchanged the other above
assumptions, ΨJ may be negative. If this occurs, then the above conclusions are rever-
sed. Clearly, the effect on the risk premium of the risk associated to future prospects is
an empirical question which deserves further investigation.
It is interesting to note that, when compared with the risk premium derived by Duffie
and Epstein (1992a) for a reproducible asset, an important difference is the presence of
the endogenous factor appearing in the discount rate in the case of the nonrenewable
resource. This factor derives from condition (3.24), which is specific to the fact that the
asset is a fixed stock of a nonrenewable resource and that this non renewability generates
an irreversibility in the portfolio decision. Hence, with stochastic differential utility, the
discount rate ρ+ fJ(t) plays a role in determining the risk premium associated with the
decision to invest in a nonrenewable natural resource stock, a role which is absent in the
case of a conventional reproducible asset.
Finally, as pointed out by Livernois (2009, p.37) and Krautkraemer (1998, p.2102),
changes in expectations regarding future prospects may have an influence on the evolu-
tion of resource prices and evaluating its significance is likely to play a greater role in
future empirical research. Since p = λ + rγ(θ2), it is a straightforward matter to use the
stochastic Hotelling rule (3.25) to derive the equation for the expected evolution of the
market flow price of the resource, which is given by :
1
p
1
dt
Et(d p)=
(
1− rγ
p
){
r(t)+ρ+ fJ(c(t),J(t))− c(t) fcc(t)fc(t) σSc(t)−
J(t) fcv(t)
fc(t)
σSJ(t)
}
+(
rγ
p
)
γ ′µ2+
γ ′′σ22
2
γ

(3.33)
Thus, in addition to the effect of the endogenous discount factor and of the two so-called
beta coefficients on the expected rate of growth of the resource price, this equation also
highlights the effect of the evolution of the cost of extraction, as captured in the last term.
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3.5 Concluding remarks
The management of nonrenewable natural resources under risk diversification is a
long-term process where future prospects and revisions in expectations about future
prospects over time plays a key factor. This paper has extended the natural resource
model of Gaudet and Khadr (1991) to the class of stochastic differential utility of Duf-
fie and Epstein (1992b) in order to attempt to take this fact into account. The paper
shows how this affects both the rate of return on nonrenewable resource stocks and the
gross market price of the extracted resource. One thing that comes out clearly is that
the precise direction of the effect of assuming a stochastic differential utility framework
depends heavily on a number of assumptions that need to be explored empirically. The
formulation presented in this paper could potentially provide a framework for doing so.
CONCLUSION
L’incertitude, qu’elle soit relie´e a` la queˆte de l’he´ge´monie politique, a` des chocs sur
la consommation, ou aux perspectives futures de l’e´conomie, est un facteur qui influe sur
la gestion de l’environnement et des ressources naturelles. Chacun des trois chapitres de
cette the`se a traite´ d’un cas diffe´rent de ces trois types d’incertitude. Le premier essai
a montre´ que dans un contexte de course a` l’he´ge´monie politique au niveau internatio-
nal : le niveau d’e´mission d’un pays pauvrement dote´ est supe´rieur au niveau d’e´mission
d’un pays richement dote´, si les dotations des pays pauvrement dote´s sont accrues, en
laissant constante celles des pays richement dote´s, alors la pollution globale baissera ;
accroıˆtre les dotations des deux types de pays dans les meˆmes proportions, et donc ac-
croıˆtre la dotation moyenne dans la meˆme proportion, baissera la pollution globale ; re-
distribuer des pays richement dote´s vers les pays pauvrement dote´s tout en maintenant
fixe la dotation moyenne, re´sultera en ge´ne´ral en un accroissement du niveau d’e´quilibre
de la pollution globale. Accroıˆtre les dotations des pays pauvres reviendrait a` renforcer
leurs capacite´s institutionnelles et a` accroıˆtre leur capital humain. Le deuxie`me essai est
une e´tude empirique qui s’appuie sur le cadre the´orique de Gaudet and Khadr (1991)
et utilise la capitalisation boursie`re des compagnies minie`res et les re´serves prouve´es
pour analyser empiriquement le roˆle des ressources naturelles dans la diversification du
risque. Les re´sultats obtenus sugge`rent que les stocks de ressources non renouvelables,
comme le pe´trole et le charbon, sont des actifs qui peuvent soutenir une strate´gie a` long
terme d’assurance contre le risque. Le troisie`me essai montre que la prise en compte de
l’incertitude qui pre´vaut sur les perspectives d’avenir modifie la re`gle de tarification des
ressources en mettant en e´vidence le roˆle du taux d’actualisation endoge`ne et un facteur
relatif aux perspectives d’avenir de l’e´conomie. Pour y arriver, le mode`le de Gaudet and
Khadr (1991) est e´tendue aux fonctions d’utilite´ re´cursive de Duffie and Epstein (1992b)
qui prennent en compte l’incertitude lie´e aux perspectives futures de l’e´conomie dans la
prise de de´cision.
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Annexe I
Appendix to Chapter 2
I.1 List of oil and coal companies
Tableau I.I: Sample of oil Companies
Companies Beginning 1 End
UNITED STATES STEEL CORP 1959(02) 2006(12)
STANDARD OIL CO CALIFORNIA 1959(02) 2006(12)
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO 1959(02) 2006(12)
STANDARD OIL CO N J / EXXON MOBIL CORP 1959(02) 2006(12)
UNOCAL CORP 1959(02) 2005(12)
BRITISH PETROLEUM LTD 1962(07) 2006(12)
KERR MCGEE CORP 1956(03) 2006(12)
CANADA SOUTHERN PETROLEUM LTD 1962(08) 2006(12)
JEFFERSON LAKE PETROCHEMICALS 1962(08) 2006(12)
IMPERIAL OIL LTD 1962(08) 2006(12)
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 1962(08) 2006(12)
BRITALTA PETROLEUMS LTD / WILSHIRE OIL CO TX 1962(08) 2006(12)
MURPHY CORP 1962(02) 2006(12)
APACHE CORP 1963(08) 2006(12)
BARNWELL INDUSTRIES INC 1965(08) 2006(12)
BROWN TOM INC 1972(12) 2004(04)
FOREST OIL CORP 1972(12) 2006(12)
PATRICK PETROLEUM CO 1972(12) 2006(12)
NOBLE AFFILIATES INC 1972(12) 2006(12)
1. In the CRSP, the data on market capitalizations of some companies such as UNITED STATES
STEEL CORP begin in 1925, but due to the unavailability of data on monthly consumption at this period,
we were constrained to begin in 1959
xiv
TIPPERARY LAND & EXPLORATION 1972(12) 2005(09)
WISER OIL CO DE 1972(12) 2004(06)
K R M PETROLEUM CORP 1974(07) 2006(12)
MAYNARD OIL CO 1975(08) 2002(06)
GEORESOURCES INC 1976(04) 2006(12)
PYRAMID OIL CO 1976(08) 2006(12)
CREDO PETROLEUM CORP 1979(03) 2006(12)
HARKEN OIL & GAS INC 1979(12) 2006(12)
DOUBLE EAGLE PETE & MNG CO 1980(01) 2006(12)
BELLWETHER EXPLORATION CO 1980(12) 2005(06)
CENTRAL PACIFIC MINERALS N L 1981(03) 2002(02)
PARALLEL PETROLEUM CORP DE 1981(01) 2006(12)
SANTOS LIMITED 1981(03) 2006(12)
MAGELLAN PETROLEUM CORP 1982(11) 2006(12)
SASOL LTD 1982(05) 2006(12)
ENSERCH EXPLORATION PARTNERS LTD 1985(04) 2002(12)
WALKER ENERGY PARTNERS 1985 (11) 2006(12)
ANADARKO PETROLEUM CORP 1986(10) 2006(12)
NORSK HYDRO A S 1986(07) 2006(12)
PARKER & PARSLEY DEVELOPMENT PAR 1987(12) 2006(12)
REPSOL S A 1989(05) 2006(12)
ENRON OIL & GAS CO 1989(10) 2006(12)
VINTAGE PETROLEUM INC 1990(09) 2005(12)
TOTAL S A 1991(11) 2006(12)
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO 1993(12) 2006(12)
SUNCOR INC 1994(01) 2006(12)
CROSS TIMBERS OIL CO 1993(06) 2006(12)
PETRO CANADA 1995(11) 2006(12)
LEVIATHAN GAS PIPELINE PTNERS LP 1998(09) 2004(09)
DEVON ENERGY CORP NEW 1988(10) 2006(12)
xv
PETROLEO BRASILEIRO SA PETROBRAS 2000(09) 2006(12)
PANCANADIAN ENERGY CORP 2001(11) 2006(12)
STATOIL A S A 2001(07) 2006(12)
INTEROIL CORP 2004(10) 2006(12)
BILL BARRETT CORP 2005(01) 2006(12)
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC 2005(07) 2006(12)
Tableau I.II: Sample of Coal mining Companies
Companies The begin The end
WESTMORELAND COAL CO 1973(01) 2006(12)
CONSOL ENERGY INC 1999(4) 2006(12)
FORDING INC 2001(10) 2003(01)
SASOL LTD 1982(04) 2006(12)
ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES INC 2005(02) 2006(12)
ARCH COAL INC 1988(08) 2006(12)
FORDING CANADIAN COAL TRUST 2003(03) 2006(12)
JAMES RIVER COAL CO 2005(01) 2006(12)
NATURAL RESOURCE PARTNERS L P 2002(10) 2006(12)
I.2 The confidence interval for the long-run beta
Assume that the ratio parameter is
β¯ =
κ1
κ2
(I.1)
xvi
where κ1 = ∑Tt=1βt [µM(t)− rt ] and κ2 = ∑Tt=1 [µM(t)− rt ]. A point estimation of the
long run beta is given by ̂¯β = κ̂1
κ̂2
(I.2)
where κ̂1 = ∑Tt=1 β̂t
[
µ̂M(t)− rt
]
and κ̂2 = ∑Tt=1
[
µ̂M(t)− rt .
]
Let Σ̂12 =
 v̂1 v̂12
v̂12 v̂2
 denotes the covariance matrix that corresponds to (κ̂1, κ̂2).
I.2.1 Bootstrap Fieller confidence interval
The t-test statistic
t(β ) =
κ̂1−βκ̂2
(β
2
v̂2−2v̂12+ v̂1) 12
 asymp N(0,1).
The Fieller method provides the (1−α)% confidence interval by inverting the t-test
statistic. This corresponds to the values of β such that |t(β )| ≤ zα/2.
Let A = κ̂22 − z2α2 v̂2, B = κ̂1κ̂2+ z
2
α
2
v̂12, C = κ̂21 − z2α2 v̂1, ∆= B
2−AC.
The (1−α)% Fieller confidence interval depends on the sign of ∆= B2−AC.
If ∆< 0,
FC(α) = [−∞,+∞].
If ∆≥ 0,
FC(α) =

[
−B−√∆
A ,
−B+√∆
A
]
if A > 0
]
−∞, −B−
√
∆
A
] ⋃ [−B+√∆
A ,+∞
[
if A < 0.
I.2.2 Bootstrap Delta confidence interval
DC(α) =
[
κ̂1
κ̂2
− zα
2
L̂
1
2 ,
κ̂1
κ̂2
+ zα
2
L̂
1
2
]
xvii
where L̂
1
2 =
[
1
κ̂1
− κ̂1
κ̂2
2
] v̂1 v̂12
v̂12 v̂2
 1κ̂1
− κ̂1
κ̂2
2

The parametric bootstrap procedure by Efron (1979) is used to compute the cova-
riance matrix that corresponds to (κ̂1, κ̂2) as follows.
Let (α̂1
(0)
, α̂2
(0)
, α̂3
(0)
, σ̂ (0)) an estimate of (α1,α2,α3,σ) obtained from the origi-
nal sample path denoted by R(0)t . The parametric bootstrap procedure consists of the
following steps.
Step 1. Generate a bootstrap sample path R(b)t from
R(b)t = e
α̂2
(b−1)
R(b)t−1+
α̂1
(b−1)
α̂2
(b−1) (e
α̂2
(b−1)−1)+η(b)t (I.3)
where we have simulated the random variable η̂(b)t such that
E(η(b)s η
(b)
t ) =

0 if s 6= t
σ̂2
(b−1)
2α̂2
(b−1) (e
α̂2
(b−1)−1)R2α̂3
(b−1)
t−1 if s = t.
Step 2. Obtain a new maximum likelihood estimator from the bootstrap sample path
by applying the same estimation procedure.
Step 3. Repeat Steps 1 and 2 D number of times and obtain a set of bootstrap esti-
mates.
We can compute b = 1, ...,D bootstraps sample by using the estimated parameters
the discrete model and the initial values of the variable.
Step 4. From the original sample, we generate sample b = 1 by using with estimates
parameters of the original sample in the discrete specification and by simulating random
numbers representing the error term η(b)t .
Step 5. So we use the parametric bootstrap sample b− 1 to estimate the new para-
meters α̂1
(b−1), α̂2
(b−1), α̂3
(b−1), σ̂2
(b−1)
and there we plug in the discrete specification
and simulate η(b)t to obtain the sample b.
From RS(t), we use this parametric bootstrap method to obtain the bootstrap replica-
tions of the drift κ̂b1 =
∑Tt=1(µ
(b)
S (t)−rt)
T for the samples b = 1, ...,D.
xviii
Once we have estimated distribution for κ̂1, we use it to estimate the standard error
for κ̂1. This estimate is given by v̂1 = 1B ∑
B
b=1(κb1 − κ̂1)2 where κ̂1 = 1B ∑Bb=1 κ̂1b.
From the consumption RC(t), we use this parametric bootstrap method to obtain the
bootstrap replications of the drift κ̂b2 =
∑Tt=1(µ
(b)
M (t)−rt)
T for the samples b = 1, ...,D.
Using simulated distribution of the estimators
(
κ̂b1 , κ̂
b
1
)
b=1,...,D, we can compute v̂12
which is the estimate of the covariance between κ̂1 and κ̂1.
Annexe II
Appendix to Chapter 3
II.1 The derivation of equation (3.22)
To derive equation (3.22), differentiate the Bellman equation with respect to W to
obtain
fJJW =− ∂∂W
(
D J
)
,
where, from (3.18), we get that :
∂
∂W
(
D J
)
=DJW +JW r+(1−ω)
[
JW (µS−r)+
[
J1WWσ1S+J2WWσ2S
]
+JWWσ2S (1−ω(t))W
]
.
From the first-order condition with respect to (1−ω) (condition (3.20)), the last term
vanishes and this equation reduces to :
∂
∂W
(
D J
)
=DJW + JW r.
Using the first-order equation (3.19), equation (3.22) follows immediately.
II.2 The derivation of equation (3.25)
To derive the Hotelling rule (3.25), use the Itoˆ product rule to obtain
d( fc(c,J)λ )
fc(c,J)λ
=
dλ (t)
λ
+
d fc(c,J)
fc(c,J)
+
d fc(c,J)dλ
fc(c,J)λ
(II.1)
where the quadratic variation is given by
d fc(c,J)dλ
fc(c,J)λ
=
[
c fcc
fc
σcσS+
J fcJ
fc
σJσS
]
dt+o(dt). (II.2)
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Now apply the operator Dz = 1dt Etdz to both sides of equation (II.1) and use equation
(3.23) to obtain (3.25).
